Youth Culture and Globalization:
The Articulation of Tradition, Modernity, and
Postmodernity in the Youth Culture of Students
of the University of the Philippines, Diliman

Gerardo M. Lanuza

Introduction

In my study of youth culture among the students of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, I was surprised to find out that despite the steady phase of modernization in the larger Philippine society, the youth culture of the students still betrays dominant traditional values and traits. I was surprised, that, given the fact that the university is a spatial field where modernization has its very likely stronghold, the students are very much attached to family values and traditional values associated with it. This paper is an attempt to explain this phenomenon, while at the same time connecting my analysis to the wider issue of globalization. My analysis is very tentative and is based mainly on my study of youth culture of the University of the Philippines. The analysis therefore can only be considered as preliminary and may not necessarily be applied to other forms of youth culture and subculture in other localities without further qualifications.

Age categorization and social reproduction

In his classic study on youth and society, Eisenstadt (1956, p.28), writing in the structural functionalist tradition, asserts that “the function of differential age definition is to enable the individual to learn and acquire new roles, to become an adult, etc., and in this way to
maintain social continuity." Moreover, differential age definition "serves as a category according to which various roles are allocated to various people; for the individual, the awareness of his own age becomes an important integrative element through its influence on his self-identification." In short, Eisenstadt is arguing that age categorization is necessary for the proper socialization of individuals to adult roles. In turn, this is necessary for the continuity of social reproduction. Eisenstadt, however, denies the complete compatibility or perfect fit between social reproduction and the functions of age categorization. Perfect fit can only be approximated in closed or traditional societies where kinship structures are very dominant.⁴

However in universalistic or modern societies, socialization through age categorization is made problematic by non-familial structures and institutions that inculcate values that are in conflict with family orientation and kinship ties. This is more acute in societies that are undergoing rapid modernization. To explain this complex system, I will use the model of structuration of youth culture which I derived from my study of UP youth culture. My model, I hope, can contribute towards explaining the structuration of youth culture in (post)modernizing nations in the era of globalization.⁵

The structuration of youth subcultures⁶

For Michael Brake (1985, p. 24), youth subcultures provide particular functions for the young. First, they offer magical solutions to certain structural problems created by the internal contradictions of socioeconomic structure. Second, they offer a culture, from which can be selected certain cultural elements such as style, values, ideologies and life style. Third, they offer an alternative experience of social reality. Fourth, they offer, through expressive elements, a meaningful way of life during leisure. Fifth, they offer solutions to the individuals concerning existential dilemmas. In particular, this involves the bricolage of youthful style to construct an identity outside work or school.

Counterculture should be distinguished from subculture. Subculture refers to "the meaning system and modes of expression developed by groups in particular parts of the social structure in the course of their collective attempts to come to terms with the contradictions of their shared social situation. More particularly, subcultures represent the accumulated
meanings and means of expression through which groups in subordinate structural positions have attempted to negotiate or oppose the dominant meaning system. They therefore provide a pool of available symbolic resources which particular individuals or groups can draw on in their attempt to make sense of their own specific situation and construct a viable identity” (Murdock, as quoted in Brake, 1985, p. 27).

On the other hand, Milton Yinger provides a very helpful definition of contraculture. Yinger suggests that contraculture exists “wherever the normative system of a group contains, as a primary element, a theme of conflict with the values of the total society, where personality variables are directly involved in the development and maintenance of the group’s values, and wherever its norms can be understood only by reference to the relationships of the group to a surrounding dominant culture” (1960, p. 629). He also suggests that we treat subculture and contraculture as a continuum in which “sub-societies fall along a range with respect to each criterion.” He points out that the only difference between the two is that conflict theme in contraculture is central and that the “theme itself expresses the tendencies of the persons who compose it.” Further, contraculture can only be understood “by giving full attention to the interaction of the group which is its bearer with the larger society.”

My study of youth culture of the students of the University of the Philippines suggests that the various subcultures among the youth are dominant over the contracultural ones. I will now elaborate on the structuration of these subcultures and contracultures.

The dominant influence of the traditional institutions

Youth culture in general is a product of the dynamic interaction between the forces of tradition represented by the family and religion, the secularizing currents of the mass media, the liberalizing processes in the school, and the sectarian tendencies of the peer group. These forces are traditionally known in sociology as the agents of socialization. The dynamic interactions between these various forces produce unique youth subculture (Figure 1). Hence, to understand the process of social reproduction through age categorization, it is necessary to understand the interplay among these institutions.
Figure 1. A General Model for Structuration of Youth Culture

In the case of UP youth culture, the mutually reinforcing socializing effects of the family and religion work towards the reproduction of the dominant, parent culture. On the other hand, the peer group, mass media, and the school pull the direction of socialization towards the other end. It is in this dynamic conflict, complementation, and neutralization that youth culture and various youth subcultures are formed (Figure 2).

Insofar as the family and religious institutions are dominant in the process of structuration of youth culture, they serve as disciplinary institutions that monitor and regulate the modernizing impact of mass media, the peer group, and school. The extent of the influence of these institutions, for instance, can be gleaned from the fact that most students idolize and see their parents as role models. The parents also have a dominant role in the important areas of decision-making processes (Table 1), and the students prefer to live with their parents than stay in the dormitories.
Figure 2. A Derived Model for Structuration of UP Youth Culture

Table 1. Character of respondents’ Idols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character of Idols</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family-related</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movie and media personalities</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious personality</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athlete</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientists</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business persons</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, religion remains as a pervasive force in the life of the youth. Most of them, for example, still hold traditional religious beliefs. Furthermore, religious practices and beliefs have the highest predictive power in predicting the moral beliefs, practices, and sexual
experiences of the students. This persistence of traditional religious beliefs and practices among the students is further fortified by the presence of various religious and quasi-religious organizations in the campus.

The peer group as surrogate institution of the family

The peer group in return acts as a mechanism upon which the youth can modify and process the habitus they accumulated through family interactions and religious socialization. The peer group can do this because it serves as the immediate reference group of the youth outside the family circle (Brown, Lohr, & Trujillo, 1990). As a reference group, it defines the socially acceptable behavior for its members. It develops a quasi-sectarian character through its out-group and in-group distinction (cf. Coleman, 1961; Dunphy, 1969). Peer groups can also heighten sectarian tendencies by competing with other non-peer group based loyalties and ties of the youth. It is therefore a potent force in neutralizing and processing the family-induced subjective dispositions of the youth.

However, spatial proximity of the peer group does not necessarily mean that the peer group promotes anti-family or anti-adult values. It is certainly possible that the peer group could be supportive of the traditional values of family and religion. Nevertheless, in the literature, the portrayal of youth culture as anti-social is very dominant. This is popularized by the pioneering study of Stanley Hall (1904), who characterized adolescence as a stage of “storm and stress.” Psychologically, the youth are experiencing various critical changes in their personality. It is a period of search for and assertion of their individual identity (Erikson, 1963a; Freidenberg, 1959; Widdicombe & Wooffitt, 1995). They find themselves more and more dissociating from the primary ties with their parents and families in order to establish ties with the outside world and build individual autonomy and identity (Erikson, 1963b). This leads Talcott Parsons (1950) to characterize adolescent subculture as (1) being rebellious against adult expectations and authority, (2) having the tendency to be conformist to the peer group, and (3) having romantic adherence to emotionally significant objects. Other sociologists call it a “world of irresponsibility” (Green, 1968, p. 113).10

However there are also sociologists who deny such extreme characterization of youth culture. For instance, the classic study of Frederick
Elkin and William A. Westley (1955) showed that teenagers of Montreal suburbs were very much integrated into the adult culture. Margaret Mead (1943) questioned S. Hall's theory of "storm and stress" by arguing that storm and stress is not universally shared among youth of various cultures. Hence, adolescence is cultural rather than psychological. Others like Reuben Hill and J. Aldous, Jr. (1969), found that religious beliefs remain relatively stable between generations. Clark (1974, p. 438) insists that subculture, defined as a way of solving structural problems of individuals, also maintain cultural continuity with the parent culture by utilizing the latter's symbolic resources. Other writers attack the notion of teenage subculture as only a ploy used by parents to blame the peer group for the problems they have about their kids (Sebald, 1984, p. 219).

The pervasive influence of class

My study does not support the dominant image of youth culture advocated by Stanley Hall and other scholars on youth culture. My data point otherwise. My findings show clearly that the peer group, far from subverting the values of the adult world, does reinforce the values of middle class families. For instance, most students join academic and religious organizations. Joining these organizations strengthen the traditional values of middle class families. This in not surprising considering the fact that majority of the youth included in my study come from middle class families. This observation is derived from the following results: the educational and occupational background of the respondents' parents (Figures 3 and 4), and the educational background of the respondents.

The respondents, having dominant middle class habitus, have middle class subculture. This middle class subculture exhibits the following characteristics: it is familistic, that is, supportive of the values of marriage and the family. It has mainstream religious character, is career oriented, is attuned to the influences of Western culture, and is liberal in some aspects. Needless to say, there are also pockets of subcultures that are ensconced in the UP youth culture. But these are sporadic and marginal at the moment. Within these pockets of subcultures, nourished within peer groups, the youth are exposed to various modernizing perspectives and alternative value systems. For instance, most of the students learned sexual information and had experienced some of these through the influence of the peer group.
Pockets of countercultures

It would be simplistic to say, based on the foregoing discussion, that the current dominant youth culture in the University is an unmistakable clone of the parent, adult culture. While the dominant youth culture in the University spawns middle class values and practices, nonetheless, there are also countervailing subcultures in the University. These sporadic and disjointed subcultures are often mistaken as the representative of the dominant culture in the University.
First, there is the **subculture of cyberkids**. The computer nerds are the students who usually have personal computers, have access to the Internet, are using e-mail, regularly chat through the Internet, and explore their computers as their hobby. The students in this subculture are distributed among the year levels and sex category.

Second, there is the **subculture of the unbelievers**. They are the atheists, the agnostics, the humanists, and free-believers. These non-traditional believers are usually female senior students who are currently enrolled in either the applied sciences or the pure sciences. They have a nonsectarian high school background. They usually have a middle class background. This group does not share with the average students the same religious beliefs and practices. This group possesses liberal attitudes towards sexual issues, family and marriage issues. They also feel that their education in the University undermines their traditional religious beliefs. This skepticism came from their teachers, friends, the books they read, and the groups they joined.

Third is the **radical culture of student activists**. The activists are the students who join political rallies, who sympathize with peasant strikes, who think that the greatest problem of mankind today is political in nature, and who also believe that the goal of UP students today should be to change the political and social conditions of our country. They are usually senior students and most of them have experienced staying at the dormitory. Most of them are members of either/both socio-civic or/and political organizations. They tend to idolize great political leaders. This group tends to be liberal when it comes to sexual and moral issues. They are nonhomophobic.

Fourth, there is also the **subculture of sexually active students**. The sexually active students are those who had engaged in extreme forms of sexual practices like premarital sex, cybersex, homosexual sex, and paid commercial sex. Most of them are males with urban background. They have liberal attitudes towards sexual and moral issues. They do not share the religious beliefs and practices of the average UP students.

Finally there is the **subculture of the organizational students**. These students are usually senior female students. Most of them have experienced staying at the dormitory. They also have work experience. They are usually found in their organization’s *tambayans* after their classes. They have
mainstream religious orientation, and have mixed attitudes towards sexual and moral issues. Included in this category is the “frat” (fraternity) subculture. This is mainly composed of junior and senior students and law students. This subculture is distinctive for its very strong emphasis on the value of brotherhood, and its tendency towards aggression against other fraternities (Zarco & Shoemaker, 1990).12

The school as locus of modernization

These subcultures are spatially embedded within the University system. The school provides the spatial sanctuary for the development of these various youth subcultures. Its territorial expanse is the niche for the formation of diverse peer groups and cliques. These different, overlapping peer groups act as reference groups for the youth outside the family. However, the University is an ambivalent force insofar as it tends to reproduce the values of the dominant culture, while simultaneously undermining the plausibility structure of the youth, and thereby pluralizing their worldview.

On the one hand, the University tends to reproduce the dominant middle class values by inculcating the values required for youth to enter the plural and multicultural world of the adult. On the other hand, its secular and liberal tradition,13 offers the youth new “plausibility structures” (Berger, 1968) that tend to undermine, if not modify the students’ habitus. The modernizing currents in UP youth culture are found in the liberal views of the youth on certain moral issues such as divorce; their attitudes to certain sexual issues like pre-marital sex and petting and necking; and in gender issues like females courting males.14 However the degree to which the University can undermine the habitus, especially the traditional aspects, of the students, is dependent also on their degree of prior religious socialization outside and inside the University. My data show that most of the students are coming from families with strong religious background and from schools with religious sectarian orientation. Moreover there are also buffer sub-institutions within the University that reinforce the religious habitus of the youth. These are the religious organizations and various sects in the school. They provide competitive spiritual services that are otherwise given by secular institutions like the various offices of guidance and counseling. Needless to say, teachers’ religious orientation and the academic setting within the University are conducive to spiritual
development of the students. This is borne out by the fact that most students said that their stay in the University did not alter or radically change their religious beliefs (Table 8). These would partly explain the arrested secularization that is transpiring in the University. As a result, most students exhibit mainstream religious beliefs and practice traditional religious rituals (Tables 2-8).

### Table 2. Belief of respondents in life after death

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>N = 282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(missing cases: 5)

### Table 3. Distribution of respondents by practice of prayer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prayer Practice</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>(100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(missing cases: 2)  N = 282

### Table 4. Amount of time in a day spent in private prayer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time for Prayer</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 30 minutes</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30 minutes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N = 260</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5. Distribution of respondents by church attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prayer Practice</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>N = 282</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(missing cases: 4)
Table 6. Frequency (in a month) of attendance in mass/fellowship/worship services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church Attendance</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very often</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes/Rarely</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N = 264</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Effect of UP education on religious faith

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With effect</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can't say</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>280</td>
<td><strong>N = 282</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (missing cases: 2)

Table 8. Effect of UP education on respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has strengthened my religious faith.</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has undermined my religious faith.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>N = 115</strong></td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Careerism as the dominant value of youth

The University introduces youth to the values of the adult world. It is here that the dominant value of the youth is milled and reproduced. The centrality of academic life and the value of academic excellence are fostered in the University. This is because university education is a preparation for youth’s future career. Every other value is subordinated, if not, are treated as peripheral to academic excellence (Figure 5 and 6). This emphasis on academic excellence, fortified by the climate in the University, links youth culture to middle class culture. And this is also inculcated by the family, religion, and the peer group. Schooling is seen merely as a stepping stone towards attaining a middle class lifestyle.
This striving also explains the muted character of countercultures. The values associated with middle class lifestyle still appear plausible for the youth. Following Robert Merton's (1968, p. 195) typology of deviant actions, youth at this point, would be classified as conformists. That is, most of them have accepted the dominant goal of middle class culture, which is success, and the legitimate means to attain such goal, which is education. This is consistent with the observation of B. Berger (1963) that most young people manage to pass through life without involving themselves in any teenage culture, or in its deviant forms. Even commitment
to deviant subcultures may even be interpreted as temporary and not lasting. These youth are seen by deviant subculture as a negative reference group, the conformist, or straight youth (Brake, 1985, p. 23).

The dynamics of change

It is in this dynamic structuration of youth subculture that the family and the religious institutions may be compelled to modify their values and accommodate the innovations of youth subcultures. The family and religious institutions calibrate themselves in the face of the added intrusion of external strains from globalizing currents purveyed by the mass media, and may be forced directly to intervene in the process of youth subculture formation.16

Doubtless, the family and the religious institutions are also influenced by the existing youth culture. As a result of these interactions, the different elements of youth culture may develop unevenly. Some may lag behind and be left underdeveloped; some may be liberalized, while others can accelerate. For instance, youth may have traditional attitudes toward marriage and sexuality, but they may have advanced scientific skills and knowledge, or they may be politically radical but with mainstream religious orientation.

Based on the present study, the assertion that the general character of a particular youth culture varies according to the interplay of the different agents of socialization in a given period of time, needs to be qualified by a subsidiary presupposition. This presupposition has to do with articulating youth culture within the dialectic of tradition, modernity, and postmodernity. The preponderance of the traditional forces of the family and religion will result in a youth culture that reproduces most of the traits of the dominant, adult culture. Now, if these traditional forces are undermined, and the countervailing forces of the mass media, peer group, and the schools converge to neutralize the traditionalizing strains of the family and religion, then, a groundwork is prepared for the development of a counterculture, notwithstanding different subcultures (Figure 2).

In the case of the current UP youth culture, the family and religion have proven themselves still effective in streamlining the youth according to the dominant adult culture. The predominant role of the family and
religion are very evident in the conservative attitudes of the youth towards various issues, their traditional beliefs, and practices. As a result, the elements of counterculture are not very prominent among the youth. Yet the elements of counterculture are not totally muted. They are sporadically scattered throughout the UP youth culture. They are ensconced in pockets of heterogeneous youth culture in the University. These pockets of countercultures do not coalesce at this period, and therefore, they do not have enough power and vigor to challenge and undermine the dominant culture among UP students.

The fact that counterculture and subcultures coexist within the hegemonic rule of the dominant youth culture attests to the liberal and tolerant atmosphere in the University. Indeed counterculture and subcultures can flourish only in spaces less colonized by the forces of dominant traditional culture. And the secular character of the University of the Philippines fits perfectly well with this assertion. This process propels the dynamism of youth culture, and explains its transformation and mutations.

The future of youth culture and globalization

The current youth culture in the University reflects the powerful forces of tradition. The cumulative effects of the family and religion outweigh the onslaught of modernizing and globalizing forces at work within and outside the University. Now, how long the bearers of tradition can hold their ground amidst these countervailing forces is an empirical question. Already, one can notice here a cultural lag between the modernizing impulse coming from the larger society and the tradition elements of culture nourished within the womb of UP youth culture. Nevertheless the influence of the globalizing forces such as mass media intrusion, the introduction of the new information technology, the inroads of mass culture, and the consumerist values being fostered by the growing “mall culture,” are already being felt both within the dominant parent culture and youth subcultures. Now if this globalizing tempo and the restructuring of the politico-economic structures of the larger society steadily make their impact on UP youth culture, then, one may expect the strengthening of youth countercultures and the reinvention of different subcultures that would either resist or express these strains and social change. After all, youth subcultures are formed when the dominant adult institutions fail to provide adequate
provisions for these youthful innovations (see Brake, 1985; Sebald, 1984; Yinger, 1960).

What is produced is an articulated youth culture that accommodates three modes of culture within its core: the traditional, the modernist, and the postmodernist. Yet countercultures remain peripheral at this period in the hegemonic constitutions of youth culture being negotiated by the youth and the agents of socialization, both local and global. In this struggle for forging hegemony of youth culture, the elements of counterculture are weakened by their disjointed nature. It is further debilitated by the resilient character of the family and religion that constantly modify their strategies to accommodate the radical elements of countercultures. Moreover the family and religious institutions have spawned new forms of disciplinary mechanisms that now serve as minipanopticons that keep constant surveillance on the youth. These are the religious groups in the campus, the disciplinary practices in the University, the mainstream student organizations, and conservative student organizations. These have become the surrogates of family and the religious institutions in the University that inculcate traditional values.

The mass media and post-modernization of youth culture

The most powerful threat to this détente is the mass media. My data show that the modernizing influence on the youth is coming more from the mass media than from the peer group and the University. Furthermore mass media is also the harbinger of postmodern culture. Through the procession of information technology, the youth of the University of the Philippines can have a glimpse and share the culture of the youths from all over the world. The Internet is making communication faster and faster. Data transfer is a matter of minutes, even seconds. One can chat with another person at the other side of the globe via the modem. Meanwhile, new fashions, dress styles, hairstyles, argots, and music are constantly updated through the MTV. Printing press and photocopying machines also enable students to gain fast and easy access to newest literature in the West. Indeed globalization, defined as the process of "time-space compression" (Harvey, 1989), is shrinking youth cultures into one global village via MTV channels and websites. This explains why, for instance, aside from family members, Princess Diana, Leonardo D' Caprio, Mother Theresa, Pope John Paul II are the predominant idols of the youth in my
study. In turn, the elements of these global cultural artifacts are contextualized in local youth cultures through the process of glocalization.\(^{21}\)

Postmodernism, “the cultural logic of late capitalism” (Jameson, 1984; Harvey, 1989), is characterized by the blurring of the distinction between low and high art, the celebration of consumerism and consumerist values, the triumph of collage, pastiche, and parody, and the importance of signs as commodities (Storey, 1994; Strinati, 1995). These postmodern features are very evident in the youth’s idols and their mass media preferences (Table 9).

Postmodernity, the social condition of postmodernism, heralds the birth of simulation and the advent of cybersociety or simiurgical society (Baudrillard, 1983). In postmodern condition, the spatial links of youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Media</th>
<th>Yes, local only</th>
<th>Yes, foreign only</th>
<th>Yes, both local and foreign</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>238%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>145%</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movies</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>214%</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Mass media preferences (local or foreign type)

and their various cultures are made more and more virtual. This virtual space is solidified via text messaging, cellular phones, and other third wave forms of communication. Youthful solidarity is becoming more virtual rather than personal. The virtual character of youthful sociality in the age of postmodernity transcends the spatial confines of traditional youth culture. These phenomenal developments prod youth culture beyond the dialectic of modernity and tradition to the new cultural waves of postmodernity. It is here that crevices of resistance, or even new forms of conformism, can open up that might eventually lead to development of new youth subcultures. The closest approximation of this emerging subculture is the culture of the cyberkids. But all other youth
subcultures cannot and do not remain untouched by these cascades of postmodernity via the mass media. Some subcultures might also develop strategies that would strengthen traditional values; others might use postmodern technology, while rejecting modernist sensibilities. My study points to the complex coupling of the forces of tradition, modernity, and postmodernity. Youth of the University of the Philippines today are caught in the traditional values fostered by the family and religious institutions, but they have a modern and instrumentalist attitude towards work and career, while having a postmodern lifestyle.

Anyhow, youth today, like the youth of the University of the Philippines, are traversing the turbulent rivulet of postmodernity. In this regard, the study and analysis of youth cultures may prove to be the most fertile ground to look for in finding out the articulation of modernity, tradition, and postmodernity. This articulation marked by uneven development and contradictions is a very interesting topic for future research, especially for youth (sub)cultures in the periphery. This paper is a contribution to that end.

End Notes

1This paper is a revised and expanded version of the paper I delivered in Honor of Chancellor Claro T. Laguno, October 26, 1999, held at the Audio-Visual Room of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Most of the materials are taken from the Conclusion of my thesis.

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2I chose the University of the Philippines because it is the premier University of the country. Its students are recruited nationwide and from various ethnic, class, and social backgrounds. My study is based on a survey of two hundred eighty-two (282)
students from the eighteen colleges of the University, in depth interviews with twenty-four student leaders and twelve key informants, and secondary data analysis of the University's official student paper the *Philippine Collegian* (1995-1998).

3 I follow Parsons' model of pattern variables in delineating modernity and traditionalism (see Deveraux, Jr. 1961:40-43). These pattern variables however are to be seen not as rigid dichotomies but as a set of strategies available to actors. Affectivity, diffuseness, particularism, quality, collectivity-orientation predominate in traditional societies, but do not necessarily eliminate alternative strategies (see also Roxborough, 1988). On the macro level, the definition given by Mouzelis (1999:156) is very apposite: "Modernity refers to a type of organization which, from a social integration point of view, is characterized by an unprecedented level of social mobilization/incorporation into the center; and, from the point of view of system integration, by an equally unprecedented level of institutional differentiation...."

4 The functionalist analysis of youth culture came under fire during the "Second Wave" of youth studies led by the members of the *Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies* (see Jones, 1988:711ff.).

5 By youth culture, this study refers to the way of life of a younger group of people within the age bracket of 15 to 24. In my study, youth category specifically covered all the currently enrolled AB/BS students of the University of the Philippines for the second semester of school year 1997 to 1998. The age category is taken from the definition of *The United Nations*. The UN studies employ different categories like adolescence, teenagers, and youths. When, for instance, they focus on teenage reproductive behavior, they choose the age range 13-19. The World Health Organization, the US Population Reference Bureau, and the recent study of McDewitt, et. al. (1997) focus on the age range 15-19. Youth studies tend to focus on age range 15-24. In the Philippines, erstwhile the definition of youth is tied with the age bracket between 7 and 24 (Gomez, et al., 1986). Today, however, *the National Youth Commission* follows the stipulation of R.A. No. 8044 that pegs the age range of youths between 15 to 30 (Amina Rasul, March 1998:12). Nonetheless, most countries now have adopted the age-definition used by *The United Nations*.

The more elaborate definition would have been based on Keniston (1972:24ff.): Youth culture is the resulting practices, values and value system, attitudes, and belief system of the younger group of people within the age bracket of 15 to 24, who are in the stage in which they experience five major tensions, namely, (1) the tension between the emerging selfhood and social order, (2) the tension between alternating estrangement and omnipotentiality, (3) the tension between acculturation and autonomy, (4) tension between
transformation and stasis, and (5) the tension between adult roles and identification with other youth.

6By structuration, I mean that the institutions of socialization serve as the condition for the development of youth subcultures, while at the same time, it also is produced and reproduced in the process of youth culture formation. This term also highlights the interplay between youth as agents and the way they reflexively produce and reproduce their own (sub)culture. I borrowed this term from Giddens (1989).

7This is also reflected in the study of McCann Erikson (1989).

8Insofar as I want to write an analytic paper, I deliberately kept to a minimum the empirical details based on my study. For the empirical details, readers can consult my MA Thesis, “A Sociology of Youth Culture: A Sociological Analysis of Some Selected Components of Youth Culture of the Students of the University of Philippines, Diliman.” A shorter version is found in my “A Derived Model of Structuration of Youth Culture: The Sociology of Youth Culture of the Students of the University of the Philippines-Diliman,” published by the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy Publication Office as a monograph (in press).

9By “habitus” Bourdieu (1977:95) refers to “a system of generative schemes adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted.” Habitus only exists in the heads of the actors. But it is durable. It is present when it is actualized and used for actions. Habitus is acquired and learned through a process of socialization. The dispositions contained in a habitus are learned habitually rather than consciously. Habitus refers not only to dispositions of agents but also to a disposition of a given group or class. Habitus is a product of objective structures and passed from one generation to another. Practice is produced through the encounter between the habitus (dispositions) and the external constraints in the field. However practices are harmonized with other practices within a given field without any “deliberate pursuit of coherence” (Bourdieu, 1986:72).

10For evaluation of existing studies, see Sebald (1984).

11For similar findings on the influence of the peer group, see Domingo (1995) and Zablan (1995).

12This list, of course, is not definitive and exhaustive. For instance, the most recent study of De Leon (2000) suggests that there is a distinctive subculture of working students, working within the University System.
The University of the Philippines was established by Act No. 1870 in June 18, 1908 to provide “advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and professional and technical training” to every qualified student irrespective of “age, sex, nationality, religious belief, or political affiliation.” Since its establishment the University of the Philippines as a secular university has been dubbed as the bastion of moral liberalism, political radicalism, and academic freedom (Carino, 1995).

My initial non-parametric tests showed that gender had no significant relationship with relevant variables (even controlling for other variables). Regrettably, I cannot discuss the gender components of youth culture at this point. The gender component of youth culture is a major topic in its own right. I will address this issue in a separate article.

This is also similar to the findings of the Knowledge Management, Attitude and Value Formation In UP Degree Programs (KAVS) (1993) in which individual success is rated as one of the highest concern of UP Students (vol. 1:90).

This is perfectly demonstrated in the study of Mateo (2000) on the parental control over children’s viewing of anime television programs (see also Espeleta, 1991).

Clarke cogently points out that “the culture which was generated in response to pressing circumstances, once it is accepted as genuine and not anathema can go on to become less essentially separate and polarized and more sophisticated and complex” (1974:441).

I am very much aware of course that other scholars, like Giddens (1990; 1994) and Beck (1992; 1994), would prefer the term “radicalized modernity,” or “late modernity,” or “reflexive modernity,” as an alternative to postmodernity. In this paper I will be employing the controversial term “postmodernism” as the cultural logic of postmodern society. I have no problems equating postmodernity with “Information Society,” “Third Wave,” or “post-Industrial society,” or even “post-Fordist capitalism.” I prefer the term “postmodernism” because it captures the aesthetic character of youth’s lifestyle. However “postmodernity” should be distinguished from “postmodernism.” For a clear and concise discussion of these terms and their origin, see Hollinger (1991), O’Connor (1997), and Harvey (1989).

Other alternative definitions are provided by Robertson (1995) and Giddens (1990). Harvey’s definition is adopted here because it captures the process in which time is ordered in such a way that space is compressed, if not annihilated. Time-space compression
allows the shortening of time and the shrinking of space which facilitates exchange of messages and transfer of goods, commodities, and people from different parts of the globe.

20I have derived my analysis here of globalization from Robertson (1990). In this connection it would be very interesting to analyze how this linkage among local youth cultures might be forging global youth culture, and how this global culture is being “glocalized.”

21Robertson (1995:28ff.) derived his use of “glocalization” from The Oxford Dictionary of New Words (1991 edition). Glocalization involves “the simultaneity and the interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and the local, or—in more abstract vein—the universal and the particular.” Glocalization opposes the notion that globalization produces homogenization of cultures. Globalization involves both the localization of the global and the globalization of the local.

22My discussion here is based on the Beyer’s (1994) analysis of globalization and religion.

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Gerardo M. Lanuza is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman.