Liberalism and Nationalism:  
The Role of the Filipino Intelligentsia

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Among other developments that may be said about a modernization process include the following: the emergence of an all-powerful secularized State; the division of society into distinct sets of groups organized largely along class lines, rather than on religious or kinship bases; a highly "rational" or rationality-oriented bureaucratic administration in the state and economic life; widespread literacy through an extensive and secularized educational system; a high material standard of living; a university system devoted to the "cultivation of truth in science and scholarship"; transmission of a cultural heritage; training of persons in the professions of law, engineering, and medicine and the service of state, church, and economic life (ibid 1961:1). By implication, the intelligentsia, particularly those in non-Western societies, as a product of these multiple modernizing developments, are likewise committed to the initiation, continuation, and deepening of these processes.

This view is corroborated by a few other social scientists studying the emergence of an intelligentsia in the modernizing world as a discrete social phenomenon. Kautsky for example asserts that intellectuals, those "persons with advanced standing in the humanities, sciences, and social sciences", are products of a modernization process and would "include all those natives in the underdeveloped countries, most likely to be
found among the aristocracy and the businessmen who have, through the contacts afforded by colonialism, become aware of the world beyond their own culture area, and have obtained an advanced education appropriate to an industrial country, or who are at present students obtaining such an education" (Kautsky 1967:45). A similar view is echoed by Benda who, in an article entitled "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites", further elaborates on the social position of non-Western intelligentsia relative to their Western counterparts. The former, he claims, are a "ruling class, or rather the ruling class, par excellence, whereas elsewhere intellectuals do not as a rule constitute a socio-political class of their own so much as an adjunct to other classes or groups in society" (Benda 1960:237). Among this group we find representatives like Nehru of India, Kenyatta of Kenya, Nasser of Egypt, Recto of the Philippines, and Ne Win of Burma.

As socially-aggregated persons, intellectuals perform a multitude of socially-constituted roles. They are not solely confined to the production of knowledge as has been traditionally associated with their class. They are also diffusers of "high" culture, providers of national and cross-national models, social change agents, and political actors (Shils 1968:409). The many faces of the modern intellectual include "the independent man of letters, the social scientist — pure and applied, the scholar, the university professor, the journalist, the highly educated administrator, judge or parliamentarian" (ibid.:1). In non-Western societies, they occupy the positions of president, prime minister, university chancellor, and national writer and thinker. Quite undeniably, the intellectual is a citizen in a particular society, endowed with certain privileges, but more importantly, with social responsibilities and obligations.

Taking the cue from the aforementioned ideas, this essay will explore a set of related ideas beginning with the rise of a Filipino intelligentsia. The Philippines is a country which has developed, under the aegis of colonialism, a distinct intellectual class of the kind Shils and Benda described above. In treating this theme, several major points must be underlined. First, the formation of a Filipino intellectual class is a simultaneous development with the rise of what may loosely be referred to as a Filipino "nation". These two processes did not occur by mere coincidence, as will be illustrated by Philippine historical developments. But rather, they are interrelated processes which occurred over a period of four centuries of Western colonization, first by Spain from the mid-16th to the latter part of the 19th century, and then by America, from the end of the 19th century until the granting of independence in 1946. Second, distinct social classes arose within Philippine society during the colonial era, gradually replacing the loosely-formed kinship groupings in pre-Hispanic times. It is from the upper classes, by virtue of their economic, political, and social advancement, relative to other social classes, that the intelligentsia sprang.

This essay shall then take a critical look at Philippine colonial history and will focus on the intellectual class as an elite group commanding social, economic, and political resources. By utilizing these, intellectuals as a group, were able to forge a Philippine society according to their conceptions, views, and beliefs of what such a society "ought" to be. Nation-building, tied to resource-access, combine what Shils refers to as the inevitable "vocation" of the intellectual (Shils 1961:12). A third central idea in this paper is that of Filipino nationalism and the role of Philippine intellectuals as nationalists. Because of the inherent and fundamental contradictions plaguing the lives of Filipino intellectuals — as initiators of protests against foreign dominance and as agitators for national independence, yet being products of the intellectual and cultural traditions and institutions of their foreign aggressors — throughout the modern history of their country they have often exhibited an ambivalent, schizophrenic, and rather confused understanding of nationalism. From protest, agitation, and pressure to cooperation, accommodation, and compromise, Filipino nationalist-intellectuals have articulated their beliefs, values, and conceptions about Filipino society which are consistent with the underlying European ideals of liberalism. Hence, the history of nationalist struggles in the modern period reveal intellectual sponsorship from the West.

The "cultural" dimension of the intelligentsia form the second part of this essay, treating it as a variable through which the various contradictions and complexities underlying Filipino intellectual life might begin to make sense. Following Shils (1960:}
1961). Kautsky (1967), Benda (1960), and Lowenthal (1960), the precarious position of modern intellectuals as a “disjointed”, “alienated”, “uprooted”, and “displaced” class shall be discussed. Non-Western intellectuals, it has been argued, experience themselves largely as being both an “insider” and “outsider” of their cultures. This curious mixture underlies the complex posture of intellectuals vis-a-vis the world: they are citizens of their particular countries, at the same time that they are “citizens of the world”. The net result of this situation is that they are neither citizens of both. The tensions and ambiguities this produces can be partially grasped by invoking Matossian’s idea of the “assaulted” intellectual attempting to assume a satisfactory position vis-a-vis the West, the past, and the lower classes of society (Matossian 1960:252 ff.).

“Mental provinciality” is a second aspect of this theme (Shils 1961:13). Fascinated by and unilaterally devoted to the achievements of the Western metropolitan culture, non-Western intellectuals have tended to exalt the values and virtues of the West, only to find themselves “peripheralized” in the wider world of intellectual activity, and paralyzed by their own perceived sense of intellectual insecurity and lack of self-esteem. One notes therefore the almost exact replication of Western knowledge systems, the emulation of Western ways and the adulation of Western virtues, not because it is necessarily for the common good, but because, it is so obviously Western. With imitation replacing creativity, Filipino intellectuals have become what Leon Wolff aptly describes as Americans’ “little brown brothers”.

In this section, the development of the social sciences in the Philippines shall be explored, with special focus on the underlying modernization bias within them. By pursuing methodological rigor and functionalist analyses borrowed from American sociology, rather than referring to the structure of power and control which contain them, Philippine social studies have legitimized (however unwittingly) the inherently inequitable social system. By assuming an uncritical posture, Philippine sociology remains a province of the American intellectual metropolis, lacking its own self-sustaining processes and its own creative independence. Furthermore, by adhering to the underlying values of modernism and individual emancipation, Philippine social scientists have failed to address the larger, more important question of the relationship between “social scientific inquiry and the pursuit of the common good” (Haan, Bellah, et.al. 1983:2). The lack of an ethical and moral orientation in favor of objectivistic science renders the scientific enterprise impotent in the face of social problems plaguing a rapidly-changing Filipino society, and incapable of making a contribution to the creation of a society founded upon moral ideals.

The Filipino Intelligentsia: A Historical Perspective

Despite 300 years of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines, the formation of a Filipino intelligentsia capable of articulating political protest and analyzing the nature of Philippine society under a colonial ruler did not occur until the mid-19th century — almost two full centuries after Spain had acquired the colonies under the jurisdiction of King Philip II. This is largely due to the nature of Spanish rule during the first 200 years. The proselytizing, Hispanizing, pacifying character of Spanish colonization resulted in the massive conversion of the “indio” into full-fledged Catholics under the direct supervision and control of the Spanish friar. As dominant factors in the colonization process, these priests and curates were considered the architects of the colonial edifice and the pillars of a theocratic society (Constantino 1978:31). The institution of the Catholic Church emerged and remained for a long time the center of people’s lives. The values of resignation, passivity, and obedience were emphasized and enforced. Fearing the retaliation of an all-powerful God who would strike down a non-compliant native defying God’s emissaries on earth, the Filipinos faced complete social, mental, and political subjugation. By making Catholics rather than citizens out of the Filipinos, Catholic rule in the islands remained virtually unchallenged for two centuries.

In the middle of the 19th century, certain changes began sweeping across Europe which were to have profound repercussions in the colonies. In what may be characterized as a shift from monastic supremacy to the ascendance of liberalism in Europe, Filipino society underwent a transformation from an outpost of Catholicism in the Far East to an
agricultural economy whose orientation was the exploitation of raw materials and the production of export crops (indigo, sugar, hemp, and tobacco) for foreign trade. By opening up the Philippines to international trade, the colony joined the mainstream of world commerce. The local inhabitants became merchants and laborers rather than just mere converts. The strictures of the friars, once the guideposts of native conduct, collapsed under the pressures of the newly-articulated value system in Europe: economic liberalism, political democracy, the rise of the all-powerful State and the withering of monarchy, and the dominance of humanistic ideals — Justice, Equality, and Fraternity.

The ascendance of an *ilustrado* class in the Philippines may be regarded as one of the most notable features of this transition. Meaning the “enlightened ones”, these *ilustrados* enjoyed the privileges of a university education both in the capital (Manila) and abroad. Taking their cues from the philosophical traditions that dominated European thought, these *ilustrados* borrowed the ideals of humanism and erected upon it their program for reforms. Their demand for social equality signalled tiredness of being viewed and treated as inferior to their Spanish counterparts. They resented and denounced the abuses of the Spanish friars and pressured for the Filipinization of the clergy. Thoroughly Hispanized and believing in the superiority of Spanish culture, the *ilustrados* committed their reform goals to that of achieving equal social and political status with Spain. For them, the colonizer represented the epitome of civilization and the model for progress. With their political aspirations not going beyond the aim of their integration into the Spanish cultural framework, the colonial framework under which the relationship of the Philippines with Spain was subsumed remained largely intact and unchallenged. Thus, the process of building a Filipino ‘nation’ and the creation of an intellectual tradition guiding this process had begun to receive its sponsorship from the borrowed traditions of the West and had proceeded under the tutelage of a colonial master.

The arrival of and subsequent occupation of the Philippines by the Americans at the close of the 19th century decisively ended Spanish rule in the islands. With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War over the question of Cuba, then also a Spanish colony, the Americans were inevitably drawn to the Philippines. Furthermore, America’s virtual isolation from European power politics for many decades and her ascendance as an economic and political power provoked the cultivation of America’s own burgeoning expansionist tendencies. President McKinley’s annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1897 received ardent support from Theodore Roosevelt (then assistant secretary of the Navy) and from Captain Mahan, both of whom led the imperialist school of thought in the 1890s especially with regards to America’s naval position. Thus even before the actual outbreak of war with Spain on April 21, 1898, the “groundwork for a new era of American imperialism in the Pacific had been laid” (Mahajan 1971:83).

More importantly, the *raison d’être* of American imperialism heavily involved a moral component. In 1917, Charles Elliott wrote that the rule of the West over Eastern people “rests on race superiority and the possession of a higher civilization — a civilization so superior as to justify its imposition upon the ancient system by force. Like the American rule in the Philippines, English rule in India, is justified by the moral and political superiority of the rulers” (Elliott 1917:47).

The ‘sale’ of the Philippine Islands was formalized under the Treaty of Paris signed between the two powers on December 10, 1898. For a sum of 20 million dollars, the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. This historical gesture points to the outright neglect by both imperial powers of the occurrence of the Philippine Revolution under an elite and plebeian leadership. Further, it bypassed the fact that Filipino revolutionaries had successfully defeated their Spanish rulers, and subsequently established a newly-independent Filipino Republic with a provisional constitution adopted on November 1, 1897. The direct and armed intervention of the United States and Spain’s complete disregard over the triumphant victory of the Philippine revolution brought about the abortion of the first independent republic ever to exist in Asia.

American colonial occupation of the Philippines was to last for almost 50 years. Under their colonial administration, the Americans utilized the already existing social divisions to facilitate colonial rule. Through a system of semi-indirect rule, as opposed to Spain’s direct intervention, the
Americans in the Philippines co-opted the local aristocrats and the educated *ilustrados* as conduits for American colonial policy. Members of these groups served as power brokers and cultural intermediaries for the local inhabitants and their new American rulers. By co-opting them as allies, American rule prospered with virtually little or no opposition from the Filipino masses. With a promise of independence at some future indefinite date, and with the prospect of assuming key government posts once the Americans have departed, the Filipino leadership was gradually but certainly seduced by their “benevolent” American rulers.

The most significant policy of American administration was the provision of a common education for all Filipinos. Without certainty as to “whether, in view of their history, training, and racial qualities, the Filipinos possessed the moral fiber necessary for the proper use of the conventional education”, American colonialists adopted the policy of universal public education, not on humanitarian grounds, but in order to “curtail the certain dangers resulting from the presence in the country of a mass of ignorant people of an excitable disposition and easily misled into lawless violence by unscrupulous leaders” making them “less liable to be led by political leaders into insurrectionary schemes” (Elliott 1917:224-5). Having learned from the Spanish experience, where the lack of education was viewed (rather erroneously) as one of the immediate causes of the revolutionary outbreak, the Americans proceeded with their elaborate pacification scheme (through education), under the pretext of preparing the Filipinos for eventual self-government. Common schools were everywhere established, American textbooks were purchased, and Filipino students were taught to read and write in the English language. In July 1901, 600 teachers—a second army of occupation—sailed to the Philippines aboard the ship Thomas. This prompted Elliott to write: “surely, the most remarkable cargo ever carried to an Oriental colony” (ibid: 229).

The net effect of American rule in the Philippines was the generation of a “reservoir of goodwill” among the Filipinos. Democratic principles disseminated in the schools attracted the masses to pursue an education. The promise of social mobility for a literate population proved equally seductive. Yet the reality of limited opportunities under a highly inequitable and essentially closed social structure escaped the “miseducated” Filipinos. Seduced by the social allure of literacy, Filipinos found themselves in a situation where their raised hopes and expectations were inevitably doomed to disillusionment.

As the promise of American-style democracy took root in the minds of the Filipinos, and as American society became the ready-made model for the Philippines, the militant nationalist sentiments that still existed at the beginning of American rule were slowly undermined. Succeeding generations of Filipinos were inculcated with the concepts of American altruism and fair play, of liberal democracy and free enterprise, and of America as the highest embodiment of learning and civilization. A nation of imitators and receptors of American products and methods arose, unmindful of the question whether or not these were suitable to existing social conditions. Intellectual traditions flourished under American tutelage and became even more firmly chained to their colonial masters. The miseducated Filipino consequently, became America’s foremost ally.

Some Filipino leaders, however, regarded with suspicion and distrust the ongoing Americanization process in the Philippines. Yet nothing in their critique suggested that the prevailing social inequalities continued to be perpetrated by American colonialism, in alliance with the local elite. Nor did they touch upon the

“In the absence of their own cultural discourse, the Filipinos’ encounter with the Western powers doomed them to subjugation.”

“. . .The borrowing of liberalist ideals from where nationalists fashioned their struggles only resulted in the continuation of colonialism.”
conspiratorial role of American education — the handmaiden of colonial policy — in leaving the structural inequalities essentially undisturbed. Manuel Roxas, a prominent Filipino politician in 1930, launched a scathing attack against

the present system of public education which is carrying on a subtle propaganda to kill the nationalist sentiments of the people of the Philippines. Perhaps that was the original purpose of the American administration in the hope that the Filipinos will forget their aspirations for freedom. Shall we let our children grow under the influence of such a system? We can never permit our children to become more American than Filipino (as quoted in Mahajani 1971:304).

An essential and interesting question still remains: had these children been more "Filipino" than "American", would they come to a realization of the inequitable distribution of power and control in their society?

By invoking liberalist ideals, as their counterparts did during the Spanish period, Filipino nationalists in the American period confined their sentiments to the unequal status with their colonial master, not to the unequal status among themselves. Their nationalism was, for the most part, passive, propagandistic and intellectualistic, divorced from the raging politics of everyday social life.

**Philippine Nationalism and the Filipino Intelligentsia**

Intellectuals who were educated in the West, or in home institutions governed by the traditions of the West, acquire both the knowledge and values of an industrialized civilization. They become admirers of Western political systems and ideologies and adhere to the values of democracy, equality, and social justice. These values which arose out of a specifically industrial environment make intellectuals "subversive of an order based on the rule of native aristocracy and a foreign colonial power" (Kautsky 1967:46). Nationalist sentiments arising among the intellectual classes of non-Western countries inevitably express these sentiments in pro-industrialist, anti-colonialist terms. Being the first groups of people to become aware of the "backwardness" of their country, intellectuals themselves aspire to modernity, assimilate the new traditions that have been generated by a different cultural tradition in another part of the world. As leaders of nationalist movements, and as products of the modernization process, intellectuals are the only ones who can effectively question these processes. They have, unlike other groups, broken out of the rigid class lines of the old society, they have a vision of the future and some ideas, however vague or impractical, of how to attain it, and they are, almost by definition, skilled in the use of the written and the spoken word. Furthermore, the intellectuals have the simple advantage over other members of other groups of having free time on their hands. Unemployed or underemployed and yet often receiving enough support from their wealthy families to be able to live, they have time to devote to politics, to speaking, reading, writing, to agitating and organizing, and to spend in jail or in exile, and, if soon thereafter, in the government (Ibid:51).

Within the Philippine context, a Filipino intelligentsia is also synonymous with a Filipino middle class created by economic progress, educational advantage, and contact with newcomers and the ideas they brought along with them. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 allowed the influx of new ideas into the colony. Liberalism came to Spain after the Spanish Revolution of 1868 wherein the monarchy was deposed and replaced by a liberal regime. Spanish liberals and officials were sent to the Philippines, and the introduction of certain reforms in the colony — religious toleration, freedom of speech, assembly, and press — made the colonial regime more attractive than it had been in the past. In an unprecedented move in 1868, Governor-General Carlos Maria de la Torre, opened the doors of his palace and welcomed Filipinos in it. There they "drank toasts to liberty, to the new Spanish Constitution, and to Governor de la Torre, but not to Philippine freedom" (Mahajani 1971:48, author's emphasis).

Under these new social conditions, the Philippine Reform Movement was born. Filipino intellectual-nationalists who styled themselves as "Propagandistas" were prolific nationalist writers who were recruited from the educated middle class. Some prominent names included Marcelo del Pilar, José Rizal, Pedro Paterno, Antonio Maria Regidor, Lopez Jaena, and Jose Maria Panganiban. They all urged for reforms and articulated Philippine aspirations through writing. The Propaganda Movement eventually became synonymous with literary writing as poetry, satire, novels, essays, history, and journalism were the genres through which Philippine nationalism was
expressed. The newspaper *La Solidaridad* (Solidarity) was the mouthpiece of the intellectual propagandists. The reforms that were circulated through this newspaper were the following: establishment of a civil government, legal restrictions on the powers of the governor-general, equality of individual rights for Filipinos as guaranteed by the Spanish Constitution, expulsion of friars or at least appointment of Filipino secular priests, competitive examinations to recruit officials from Spain and the Philippines, and abolition of the civil guard (Mahajani 1971:54).

Upon closer examination, the nationalism of the Propagandistas was an assimilationist nationalism. The sociopolitical thoughts of José Rizal (the novelist), of Marcelo del Pilar (the political analyst), and of Lopez Jaena (the orator), while subversive of Spanish constituted authority, were in fact, reformist and assimilationist in character. The liberal ideas and values of Europe, its social and political institutions, and its intellectual traditions formed the model for the Propaganda Movement. Without a mass following and without recognizing the fact of Spanish colonialism, the nationalism of the Propagandistas remained largely literary and rhetorical. Their articulated goal of eventually evolving a “common polity out of different races and cultures” was highly unrealistic and hopelessly naive. However, through their writing, the Propagandistas succeeded in “oiling the wheels of a greater Philippine nationalist struggle and it was out of their moderate nationalism that militant nationalism sprang” (ibid:62).

Revolutionary nationalism in the Philippines was forged under the leadership of a plebeian working as a petty officer in a foreign firm in Manila, Andres Bonifacio. He founded the Katipunan, a mass-based revolutionary organization committed to the goals of complete and unequivocal separation from Spain. But rifts within the organization inevitably brought the militant phase of Filipino nationalism to a close. Rivalry between the educated *ilustrados* and the plebeian leadership created factions which struggled for power and control of the Katipunan. In the end, however, it were the *ilustrados* under Emilio Aguinaldo who succeeded in gaining complete control of the leadership of the Katipunan. Elected as President, Aguinaldo subsequently ordered the trial of Bonifacio on the grounds of sedition and treason, pronounced him guilty, and sentenced him to death by summary execution. Meanwhile, Aguinaldo, after a signal victory in his native province in Cavite, issued a manifesto in which he urged the Filipinos “to follow the example of civilized American and European nations in fighting for their freedom” and “to march under the Flag of the Revolution whose watchwords are Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” (as quoted in Constantino 1975:173). Shortly thereafter, the Katipunan as a secret revolutionary society was dissolved, and those who insisted upon carrying on an armed struggle against Spain were branded as *tulisanes* (bandits).

Divided nationalism, a reflection of the fragmented nature of Filipino society, hastened the defeat of revolutionary nationalism in the Philippines. Strong regional sentiments prevailed, so that the revolutionary nationalism of the masses clashed directly with the policies of the rich landlords. In the Negros region, for example, the sugar barons threatened to expose the revolutionaries to the friars. Furthermore, colonialism under Spain created a division between the non-Hispanicized masses and the educated Hispanicized elite. The guiding principle of absolute autonomy under the Katipunan and the intellectuals’ adherence to liberalism and constitutional democracy further deepened existing rifts. Without a coherent and unified revolutionary ideology, the expressed nationalistic ideals became only the ideals of a small elite group rather than a widely-embraced set of popular goals shared by the masses.

The ideals of liberalism were extended into the American colonial period, once again providing the underlying tone for nationalistic sentiments during that period. Filipino nationalist writers turned to their pens to express their resentment against the Americans who were Americanizing the Filipinos through their public school system (see Roxas’ attack above). Aside from protesting against the colonizing effects of the American educational system, they also denounced the high salaries and pomp surrounding the American officialdom, deplored the rise of corruption among American officials, and characterized American government as a “great failure” (Kalaw, as quoted in Mahajani 1971:305). Other Filipino scholars, supplementing the defective Spanish accounts and tired of having their history measured only in terms
of Spanish conquest and Hispanicization of the Philippines, undertook the re-writing of Filipino history. Other intellectuals engaged in debates over the Asian Monroe Doctrine and Philippine destiny after the "granting" of independence by the Americans. Maximo Kalaw, Rafael Palma, and Claro M. Recto were the notable figures during this period.

But the nationalism of the literati and the intellectuals remained, as they did during the Spanish colonial era, under the patronage of a colonial power. Conspicuously lacking the active support of Filipino masses, unfettered by political persecution, and divided within their own ranks from other nationalists, some of whom outrightly supported and legitimized American presence in the Philippines under the liberal ideal of "cooperation", these nationalistic expressions and debates, with all their sound and fury, redounded into mere intellectual polemics with no visible or tangible impact.

Political parties which were also "allowed" by the American colonial administration proved largely ineffectual in advancing the independence cause. Dominated by wealthy Filipino intellectuals, the two-party system under the American model exhibited a purely elite membership with no real differences in their class composition nor in the interests they represented. Affiliation was determined not by ideological considerations nor by concrete social platforms, but by blood, friendship, regionalism, and the shifting alliances among party members for political expediency. The phenomenon of turncoatism became a regular feature of Philippine party politics, as did party splits and coalitions which "even then embarrased no one" (Constantino 1975:320). By co-opting Filipino leaders into a governmental machinery whose actual power and control was still centralized in the office of the American governor-general, and by allowing Filipino participation in the colonial regime, the Filipinos held the illusion that they had a "democratic" government which was however, representative only of the upper classes, and was a democratic government only in form but not in substance. The American colonizers succeeded in bestowing a legacy of Philippine politics under the purview of the Filipino elite to the exclusion of the masses.

The question of independence became a question of timing rather than a moral stance against the encroachment of an imperialist power. The flavor and tone of Filipino nationalism, which was previously militant and anti-colonialist at the dawn of American rule, ultimately became passive and conciliatory.

II

In a study of the Indian intellectuals, Shils suggests two important dimensions in the "culture" of the intelligentsia. The first is the intellectuals' sense of "uprootedness" and "alienation" and the second is their "mental provinciality". Both are distinct facets of the native intellectuals' proclivity towards modernization.

In his autobiography, the highly-respected Indian leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, moans of his suspension between East and West:

I have become a queer mixture of the East and West, out of place everywhere, at home, nowhere. Perhaps my thoughts and approach to life are more akin to what is called Western than Eastern, but India clings to me as she does to all her children, in innumerable ways; and behind me lie, somewhere in the subconscious, racial memories of a hundred generations of Brahmins. I cannot get rid of either that past inheritance or my recent acquisitions. They are both part of me, and, though they help me both in the East and West, they create in me a spiritual loneliness not only in public activities but in life itself. I am a stranger and an alien in the West. I cannot be of it. But in my own country also, sometimes, I have an exile's feeling. (Nehru 1936:597-8, as quoted in Shil 1961:63)

A similar sentiment is echoed in James Clifford's review article of Said's Orientalism. In it, Clifford notes the author's condition of "homelessness". As a nationalist Palestinian, educated in Egypt and in America, Said writes about Orientalism as an "Oriental", but only "to dissolve the category" (Clifford 1980:223). As Professor of Comparative Literature in Columbia University, Said has positioned himself from a particularly Western vantage point from which he launches his radical attack on Western cultural discourse. Like his country, Palestine, Said is a "dismembered" intellectual — parts belonging elsewhere, here and there, yet really rooted nowhere. This condition, Clifford sensibly suggests, may be taken as representative of the complex critical posture of most non-Western intellectuals everywhere.

As leaders of their own countries, roles which intellectuals inevitably assume, their
aspirations often remain "alien" to them. The intellectual does not readily forget this fact, and is emphasized even more by the foreign language in which these aspirations are expressed. The language of modernity through which the modern intellectual culture is articulated is the language of the powerful. This power is sustained not by the traditional culture to which the intellectual comes from, but from outside his/her own. In seeking to deliver a sense of \textit{nationality}, of which the intelligentsia are the first bearers of this idea, intellectuals also develop a sense of their "internationality" — having been trained in the Western or in Westernized traditions of their home institutions, and having received the inspiration for autonomous organizations from foreigners.

A further tension which haunts non-Western intellectuals is the often conflicting tendency between individuality and affiliation with a community. The liberal promise of individual fulfillment — "the valuing of individual, concrete experience, the assimilation of experience and the awareness of the boundaries of selfhood" (Shils 1961:65) — is brought into a direct clash with the intellectuals’ traditional culture of which they are still very much a part of. While espousing the virtues of progress, the lives of intellectuals remain enmeshed in the domestic culture of kinship, ethnicity and religion which "leaves memories that are neither eradicated nor made shameful by an education which was increasingly Westernized with each advancing level" (ibid:62). Caught in this web of stresses and tensions, non-Western intellectuals often exhibit ambivalence and inconsistency, remaining the paradoxical victims and beneficiaries of the foreign aggressors they both denounce and admire, and from whose institutions they find refuge. The eminent Filipino statesman, Claro M. Recto, while denouncing American Monroeism, likewise stressed the necessity of retaining some Western presence in Asia, fearing the territorial ambitions of the Japanese. While seeking to end American domination in Philippine national affairs, Recto proposed a "regulator" role for the Americans in the Far East, thereby implicitly subscribing to the view that Asia was in need of American power and protection (Mahajani 1971:315).

The enslavement of non-Western intellectuals by Westernized intellectual traditions produces what Shils calls the "intellectual provinciality" among non-Western cultures (Shils 1961:13). Due to a lack of intellectual self-confidence and self-esteem, non-Western intellectuals, however gifted, are inevitably drawn to and are fascinated by the intellectual output of the West. They are, to quote Shils, "transfixed by its shining light" (ibid). Among Filipino nationalist writers during the Spanish period, this preoccupation is evidenced by the liberal, reformist orientation among the Propaganda Movement’s ardent members:

Modest, very modest indeed are our aspirations. Our program is of the utmost simplicity; to fight all forms of reaction, to impede all retrogression, to halt and to accept all liberal ideas, and to defend all progress: in a word, to be one more propagandist of all the ideals of democracy in the hope that these might hold sway over all nations here and across the seas (as quoted in Constantino 1975:151).

The Palestinian-nationalist writer, Edward Said, falls into the same traps of intellectuals everywhere in the non-Western world. Said’s ideals of humanism which he asserts must inform all discourse, are the ideals expressed by European poets and visionaries. His analytical tools used in his radical attack against Western knowledge systems are those derived from French philosophy. In a sharp critique against the West for its totalizing, essentializing, dichotomizing treatment of the Orient, Said lapses into the same mode of viewing the West as a monolithic whole, undifferentiated and undisclosed, lacking those local cultural codes by which the personal experiences of the powerful West can begin to make sense (Clifford 1980:219).

Among Filipino social scientists, one finds this same predicament. The rise of Philippine sociology during the post-World War II era points to American dominance in its creation and development. Largely regarded as the domain within which the study of Filipino society occurs, Philippine sociology suffers from the Parsonian tradition of functionalism as the prevailing viewpoint, with its over-emphasis on how the various aspects of society are intermeshed. Furthermore, sociological studies tended to focus on the need to understand local customs rather than on the inequities of the prevailing social order. By utilizing sociological concepts developed in the West, and by applying Philippine data in an effort to achieve a systematic approach, Philippine sociology retained its non-
reformist, non-revolutionary character. Without the development of a revolutionary social analysis, and lacking a conflict approach to the study of Filipino society, Philippine sociology may be considered highly conservative in terms of its research and research findings (Weightman 1978:178).

Cultural imperialism in sociology is further illustrated by the unequal partnership in research collaborations between Filipinos and Americans. Firstly, American governmental and private funding agencies determine the subject of research. It is quite staggering to discover that the best supported sub-specialties of research in Philippine sociology are in the areas of demography and family planning. Also, the teacher-student relationship of early colonial days in which the Americans were the teachers and the Filipinos were the students extends into the research endeavor. Research collaboration therefore is hardly premised on equal partnership as it is on the more powerful donor dictating its terms to the needy and powerless research beneficiary (Junt and Dizon 1978:106).

With regards to Philippine history, its growth was stunted by several factors. The Philippines lacked a strong tradition of colonial scholarship, largely due to the denial by the Spanish and American governments to lend sufficient institutional support. Unlike their Southeast Asian counterparts who possessed a corpus of sociological, anthropological, and historical writing after the Second World War (Indonesia being a prime example), Philippine colonial scholarship was remarkably uneven in its development and highly distorted in its portrayal. Furthermore, most political history tended to be viewed from the capital Manila. This not only precluded discussion of broader questions, but distorted even more the Philippine political system. By utilizing Western scientific modes of inquiry with a prevailing tendency towards totalization, Philippine historical studies viewed Filipino society from the lens of the metropolis, with the outlying villages treated as mere peripheries. It is quite encouraging that Filipino historians, more than sociologists, have begun to engage in the production of scholarship critical of the colonial framework (see Constantino and Agoncillo, for example). Also, local and regional histories are supplanting the Manila-centric ones, stressing Philippine society not just as the sum of its numerous political subsystems, but as a "series of societies that has changed throughout its four centuries of recorded history, in response to economic, demographic, and technological stimuli" (McCoy 1982:4).

In the absence of their own cultural discourse, the Filipinos' encounter with the Western powers inevitably doomed them to subjugation. It is not, however, the case that they lacked the capability of discourse formation, but that organic process was sharply interrupted by colonialist encroachment. While the development of what may be speculated as a "native discourse" was arrested, so was the formation of indigenous institutions and the creation of what can be locally perceived as a "national state". The result therefore was the grafting of foreign institutions and organizations onto native soil, which could take root and flourish under the hegemonizing influence of the powerful West. Therefore, to say that Filipinos are intellectually dependent means that they are living neither from their own intellectual capital nor from their own intellectual efforts. This essay has demonstrated that the borrowing of liberalist ideals from where nationalists fashioned their anticolonialist struggles only resulted in the continuation of this colonialist relationship, and which is today disguised as "neo-colonialism". Furthermore, by situating the Filipino intelligentsia in a historical context, and by underwriting the class character of Filipino intellectuals, one comes to an appreciation of their multiple, and often ambivalent roles as nationalists, writers, politicians, and statesmen at the same time that they were also manipulators, compromisers, opportunists, and pragmatists. The social context of Filipino intellectuals can provide a sense of what the pattern of responses has been in relation to the question of nation-building. The rather wide range of responses to the challenge of building a "modern" nation out of Filipino society exhibits the continuing, and often disjointed, process by which personal and collective identities of all Filipinos must continue to be negotiated, not given. Filipino intellectuals cannot afford today to believe that this personal and collective identity can be granted and bestowed. Rather, this cultural authenticity and political autonomy they strive for must "no longer be seen as simply received from tradition, language, or environment."
but as also made in new political/cultural conditions of global relationality" (Clifford 1980:223, author's emphasis). For intellectuals, their particular role, following Said, must be "both in the defining of a context and in changing it"; for without that, any critique whether of intellectuals and intellectuals' roles, of nationalist movements and collective struggles, remains "simply an ephemeral pastime" (Said 1985:15).

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