Whither Studies of Asian Democratization?

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What do current and future studies of Asian democratization look like? Starting off from a minimum definition of democracy that allows for different forms, scope and content, the article weaves through the early and mainstream current approaches to the study of democracy and democratization, in general, in an effort to find an answer. It next zeroes in on the relevance and usefulness of these predominant explanatory frameworks to the analysis of Asian democratization, in particular. Comparing the Philippine, Keralan and Indonesian experiences, 11 essential themes emerge as areas for further exploration and study. These vital but comparatively neglected issues all call for a closer look at the deeper dimensions or real foundations of democratization, including the special need to focus on the problems of politicizing civil society and the so-called social capital. The paper concludes with a preliminary analytical tool for understanding such required politicization.

Not so long ago our conferences were on development and control of resources. Now it is democracy and democratization. These are the new buzzwords of the 1990s; the discourse within which everyone have to legitimate their special interests and struggle over hegemony — even authoritarian Asian rulers, not to mention entrepreneurial students and researchers.

So there is a good deal of confusion and a great need for reflection. Reflection to get some perspective; to develop fruitful approaches; and to go ahead with both scientific and political integrity. And since we can only reflect on the basis of our own different points of view, I guess I owe the reader a brief confession before going ahead.

My experiences from research in this field originate in the mid-1970s. That is, when many of the present powerful human rights and democracy proponents still did their best to prevent huge third world popular movements from even creating the most basic prerequisites for

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And Southeast Asia in the first place. But even if I never became an Indonesianist or Indologist, or expert on Kerala or the Philippines (I do not even master Bahasa Indonesia, Tagalog, Hindi, Bengali and Malayalam), I would like to think that there is instead something to thematic comparisons, if they are based on reasonably solid empirical research. And even if I am a child of the Marxian approaches to the problems of development, I also grew up among mainstream political scientists, where I continue to approach fundamental socio-economic conditions via studies of popular organizations as rational actors; that is, in everything but a structural Marxian way.

So from these experiences and perspectives — with all their pros and cons — what do the current studies of Asian democratization look like? Whither the studies of Asian democratization?

A Universal Minimum Definition of Democracy: Allowing Different Forms, Extension and Content

To begin with, and just like mainstream students of politics, I find it scientifically unfruitful and politically dubious to start off with wide or culturally relativist definitions of democracy. Definitions which tend to include explanatory factors and are wide open to partisan characteristics — Western or Asian, bourgeois or popular. Definitions which make it easy to mix perceptions of democracy with democratic packages (or concepts) and analytical definitions — and not compare like with like. To me the
essence of modern democracy in terms of its meaning is nothing more — and definitely nothing less — than sovereignty of the people in accordance with the principle of constitutionally guaranteed political equality among citizens or members, who are independent enough to express their own will. Or, if we put it in operational and minimum-procedural terms, government according to rule on the basis of majority decisions among adult citizens or members with one vote each and freedom of expression and organization. And as far as I can see, this is the common denominator among most scholars of democracy as well as political actors, no matter if they are bourgeois liberals or non-authoritarian socialists, or if they are rooted in the North or in the South.

Firstly, however, such a position does not, of course, prevent us from studying countries and actors who do not measure up to the minimum definition but yet label themselves democratic (like many Asian leaders), or internalize and alter certain democratic rights (like the Hindu chauvinist Shiv Sena movement). However, the fact that they are not democratic and do not contribute to democratization must be clearly established. And if we are interested in so-called discursive studies of democracy, the non-democratic arguments must then, of course, be situated within the discourse as a whole. A discourse within which their proponents strive for legitimation and hegemony — by advancing an “Asian model of democracy” as well as by distorting the actual meaning of democracy and marginalizing those who really promote it. A genuine democracy and democratization, which, by the way, is no less “Asian” and no more “Western” than the authoritarian leader’s Potemkin village.

Secondly, moreover, the fact that the essential meaning of democracy and the accompanying minimum definition are universal does not imply that all the associated factors are equally general. Quite on the contrary, of course, they do differ. They differ between cultures, and between levels and characters of socio-economic development, just as between theorists and actors. The forms of democracy may vary, for instance, between direct or indirect popular control. The extension of democracy may vary from the governing of narrow political institutions to almost everything people have in common, including factories and associations in civil society. The content of democracy (in terms of what is decided and implemented) may vary from attempts to promote social and economic equality to structural adjustment — as long as the above-stated essence of democracy or minimum procedures are not undermined.
Similarly, democratization may be carried out in different forms, with different scope, and with different content.

Consequently, if we give priority to the study of democracy and democratization, rather than to the ways in which resourceful rulers and associated movements legitimate authoritarianism; if we hold on to the essence and minimum definition of democracy; and if we allow for all the variations in terms of forms, extension and content; if we do all this, I do not think there is a need for serious disagreement of what democracy is about. We know what we mean, and we know what we have to explain.

So then we can start to disagree. Disagree over the preconditions for democracies with various forms, extension and content. Disagree over how such democracies may emerge in different societies, in different cultures and even in different villages. And then the main question is how we arrive at the most relevant and fruitful ways to study and explain democratization.

**Earlier Approaches:**

**Modernization — Towards Democratic or Authoritarian Rule?**

It is precisely at this point, I think, that we really need to sit down and look back to be able to discuss where we stand today and how we shall go ahead tomorrow.

When I myself entered the field, the main theses about preconditions for democracy in Asia (as in the third world in general) were still related to the need for capitalist expansion and thus, modernization, in accordance with an idealized Western pattern. A modernization which would, in turn, generate political development and democracy. Marxists as well as non-Marxists produced society-centered analyses. But while those inspired by conventional Marxism (including Barrington-Moore) emphasized the socio-economic structure, and spoke of the need for a national bourgeoisie (which would produce a nation-state and overpower remnants of feudalism with popular support), the non-Marxists spoke of modern (versus traditional) values among groups and individuals, and stressed the importance of the middle class as the bearer of those values.

Soon enough, of course, others refined this perspective. Capitalist expansion and social and economic modernization, they said, did not
automatically generate so-called political development, including democracy. According to non-Marxists like Samuel Huntington, modernization generated instead new social and political conflicts. These led to disruption, since the old political institutions could not handle all the demands and movements. Hence, there was a need for "political order" through the building of stable and modern institutions, to channelize some middle class participation and prevent popular upsurge. At worst, by drawing on the military, as in Indonesia.

Similarly, East European Marxists noted that modernization rarely produced a "national bourgeoisie" and a working class strong enough to introduce functioning liberal democracy. Hence, it was both possible and necessary to bet instead on progressive politicians and administrators within the state, at worst, even officers; to build "non-capitalism" within "national democracies"; to withstand imperialism; and to introduce land reforms and industrialization which, in turn, could generate stronger popular forces.

Dependency theorists, on the other hand, turned the picture upside-down. Capitalism and modernization, they said, could not generate democracy, only dictatorship. The countries were not really sovereign. The rulers depended more on foreign capital than on their own resources and subordinates. A kind of permanent state of emergency was inevitable. So at worst, people had to take up arms.

It is true that Marxist class analysts soon nuanced this picture by stressing the balance of forces and the different ways in which organized interests tried to affect and make use of the state. And it is equally true that some of them also spoke of an "overdeveloped," third world state that had inherited strong colonial apparatuses and become relatively autonomous, as no class was able to really dominate. But even if this made it possible, thus, to explain why, at least, elitist democracies could emerge in a few countries like India, the Marxists primarily contributed a more detailed and dynamic analysis on the rise of authoritarianism in all the other third world countries.

Finally, many scholars said that the lack of democracy was more because of the state, and the social forces within its institutions, than because of the classes in civil society. Neo-classics maintained that politicians and bureaucrats were selfish rent-seekers who, therefore,
benefited from the monopolization of huge state apparatuses and regulations. Many neo-institutionalists claimed that developmental states presupposed autonomous, efficient, and authoritarian governance. The erosion of democratic governance in countries like India was due to the lack of universalistic administration and solid political institutions. And post-Marxists maintained that third world capitalism often emerged from within the state, through privileged control and usage of its own resources and regulative powers, which, again, required authoritarian rule, or at least, state-corporatism, or a combination of populism and cacique democracy.

Mainstream Current Approaches:
Neo-modernism, Rational Elites, Civil Society and “Good Governance”

So here we were, then—in the late 1970s and early 1980s—when, despite everything, some democratization began to occur. That is, here, we were with a lot of exciting analyses and explanations of more or less authoritarian rule—which simply did not make much sense when we also had to understand democratization.

On the one hand, therefore, much of the modernization perspectives got a new lease on life. Actual developments indicated, many said, that the good old theses proved right.

To begin with, non-Marxist modernists emphasized that socio-economic modernization, in general, and the rise of stronger middle classes, in particular, really generated democracy. For instance, a huge new US project was initiated by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset in the mid-1980s. The relationship between capitalism and democracy, and the key role of the rising middle classes were still taken for granted, even though different patterns were now allowed and the key role of effective and democratically committed leadership was given special emphasis. And Samuel Huntington, of course, put forward similar arguments in his celebrated The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century though adding, as usual, the importance of stable political institutions.

For similar reasons, much of the modernist Marxian idea that capitalist development would pave the way for some democratization also returned to the forefront. Some argue that political monopolies,
arbitrary and complicated administration, and exclusionary practices obstruct the forceful expansion of capital. This may thus necessitate negotiations and liberalization — which, in turn, may lead to some democratization. At any rate, they say, the contradictions and structures generated by capitalism drive democratic reform. Others, and most convincingly Rueschemeyer and the Stephens, focus more on the social forces at play within such a framework and emphasize the primary role of the working class — in contrast to the conventional modernists’ preoccupation with the middle class and the national bourgeoisie respectively.

On the other hand, many of those who grew up with dependency-oriented analyses of capitalism generating authoritarian rule did not really abandon their long-term structural perspectives. Guillermo O’Donnell, et. al., analyzed instead the actual transitions from authoritarian rule as an open-ended process of liberalization and struggles between hard-liners and soft-liners during political conjunctures characterized by economic and ideological crisis and institutional decay. Their explanations in terms of actors’ rational action (with often unintended consequences), and the negotiations on the elite level of pacts and institutional rearrangements vary, thus, from country to country. But a common framework is, “that the bourgeoisie, or at least important segments of it, regard the authoritarian regime as ‘dispensable’ (...) either because it has laid the foundation for further capitalist development or because it has demonstrated its incompetence for doing so,” and that there is some “resurrection” of civil society.

Similarly, those inspired by neo-classical perspectives held on to the thesis about selfish political rent-seekers who nourished “over-politicization” and futile “political shortcuts.” Hence, they say, democratization presupposes the dismantling of the state, minus law and order, the promotion of capitalist market economy, and the deepening of civil society — including on the international level. And finally, of course, such efforts, like structural adjustment, are also employed to explain democratization.

This, however, was also the time when less sterile institutionalist perspectives returned to the fore. Many political scientists brought “the state back in.” A state which did not only cater to the interests of the dominant classes. Also, it had its own functions and interests, for
instance, in political stability and favorable positions vis-a-vis other states. And besides, the fact that this called for extensive resources, the state itself became more or less interested in democracy, for instance, when having to mobilize popular support.

Others were more interested in institutions as rules of the game, which then, in turn, affect human action. Hence, the many studies of how, for instance, institutional arrangements affect negotiations during transitions from authoritarian rule and how different electoral systems may then contribute to consolidation of democracy. Similarly, all the queries into the importance of rule of law and of clean and efficient administration. India’s severe problems of democracy, for example, are often explained in terms of over-politicization, on the one hand, and weak political and administrative institutions to handle demands and implement policies, on the other. The primary recipe here, of course, is the World Bank-sponsored ideas of “good governance.” But we should not forget the widespread appreciation — also in the West — of the efficient and stable institutions in some East Asian developmental states and their attempts at political incorporation of significant groups by way of co-optation and corporatist practices.

Finally, yet other institutionalists concentrate more on how culture and institutions in the society at large affect government and administration. For instance, Robert Putnam and his followers say that social capital, in terms of trust and cooperation, promotes democratic performance.

How Do the Mainstream Approaches Fare in the Asian Context?

So, how relevant and useful then are these predominant explanatory frameworks to our attempts to analyze Asian democratization?

Let me discuss this with reference to the three very different countries and settings that I know a bit about — that is India, in general, and the state of Kerala in particular, the Philippines and Indonesia.

India and Kerala may represent the cases where nation-state-led development and centralized democratic governance are in serious problem. The Philippines, on the other hand, stands out as a good example of the many third world countries where authoritarian first replaced limited democratic forms of rule, but then, went aground and
experienced a kind of middle-class resurrection of civil society and elitist democracy. And Indonesia, finally, may represent the kind of highly authoritarian governance which has contributed to rapid socio-economic development and where, at least, according to the dominant groups, democratization may undermine all this.

Firstly, the non-Marxist thesis that socio-economic modernization and stronger middle classes generate democracy. Of course, there is something to this.

In India, however, these processes and forces are also behind much of the current problems of democracy. Parts of the economic and political deregulation may be inevitable, but it certainly adds to the earlier problems of de-institutionalization. In the Philippines, moreover, the widely esteemed middle-class democratization continues to resemble much of the old “cacique democracy,” even though the old socio-economic basis of political clans and clientelism is dwindling. Hence, there is still no new solid foundation for further democratization, including reasonably clear-cut representation of different interests and ideas of societal change. In Indonesia, finally, the politically and administratively dominated expansion of capitalism means that there is a lack of even the comparatively independent business and middle-class forces which gave resonance to much of the transition from authoritarianism in the Philippines.

On the other hand, the real importance of some new, middle class professionals in the process of democratization is rarely considered within the conventional modernization framework. That is, when they form independent organizations to protect their own rights and integrity as professionals, or be able to do serious development work, and simultaneously link up with broader popular demands and efforts.

Secondly, the modernist Marxian ideas of capitalism undermining political monopolies and arbitrary rule, creating some free space and giving birth to a

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working class which will enforce democratic change. This, of course, also carry important insights.

However, it is difficult to generalize the experiences from Europe and Latin America to Asia, with its more politically engineered expansion of capitalism. Even though deregulation, privatization and efforts at more efficient state administration have been on the agenda in the Philippines since the fall of Marcos, and more recently in Indonesia and India as well, surviving rulers and executives usually manage to re-organize their old “fiefdoms” and networks. The division of labour, the subordination of people, and the appropriation of surplus are extremely complex and contradictory. We are far from a classical protracted industrial and cultural transformation in general and the emergence of a large and comparatively homogeneous working class in particular. So even if workers are likely to be of utmost importance, for instance, in Indonesia, we must find out what differs from the historical cases behind the general models of capitalism and democracy — in order to thereafter, perhaps, be able to adjust and make use of similar generalizations.\textsuperscript{12}

Thirdly, the studies of actors’ rational action and negotiations on the elite level — or the study of crafted instant democratization. This, for obvious reasons, makes a lot of sense in the Philippines. Elitist horse-trading characterized much of the actual transition from Marcos to Aquino, especially during and after the so-called people power revolution at EDSA. However, the elitist perspective neglects most of the long and widespread struggles which paved the way for and conditioned the transition and negotiations. Moreover, we are unable to understand why it was that most of this popular opposition could neither participate and make an impact in the very transition, nor play a decisive role in thereafter consolidating and deepening democracy.

Partially, this applies to India and Kerala as well. Here, most of the important efforts at rebuilding and deepening democracy are going on among popular grassroots organizations which are not fully integrated, or are unable to make an
impact, within the political system. And in Indonesia, where the most likely scenario really is negotiated pacts between post-Suharto elites, we must also recall the lack of both the bourgeois and middle-class forces and the reasonably independent civil society which elsewhere have given resonance to most of the elitist resurgence of democracy.

Fourthly, the liberal thesis about civil society against the state. Of course, nobody denies that free citizens and associations are part of or necessary prerequisites for democracy. However, theories suggesting that the deepening of civil society in itself promote democratization are hardly fruitful. In the Philippines, privatization and the resurrection of civil society have primarily given way to political bossism on the local level and personality-oriented populism on the national level. In India, so-called liberalization basically nourishes clientelism, group-specific organization, and populistic mobilization on the basis of religious and cultural identities. And in Indonesia, privatization and deregulation, as already mentioned, usually imply that politicians, bureaucrats and officers re-organize their "fiefdoms." So the separation between state and civil society remains comparatively blurred.

There is also an international dimension to the thesis about civil society against the state. Globalization and international support of human rights, many say, tend to undermine authoritarian rule and promote democracy — especially when geared through so-called civil society organizations at both ends. On the one hand, it is not difficult to agree, especially from the point of view of repressed pro-democracy groups in countries like Indonesia. But on the other hand, it is worthwhile remembering that a necessary prerequisite for democracy is a clearly defined demos — citizens or members with the right to govern themselves. And at least, I am not aware of any reasonably genuine process of democratization that has not been related to a nation-state, or a relatively autonomous region or commune within its framework.
Fifthly, the neo-institutionalists and the much wished “good governance” — which should be credited for having at least convinced some people of the fact that not only socio-economic factors but also political institutions have a bearing on more or less democratic forms of rule. However, while nobody would object to the need for clean and efficient government, the main problem is to find out under what conditions it may emerge. And this is very rarely done. Instead, “good governance,” along with the crafting of instant democracy, are often traded just like IMF-economists sell neo-liberal market solutions around the globe.

Moreover, the comparatively few neo-institutionalists who look for causes and reasons behind good or bad governance tend to apply a top-down perspective à la Samuel Huntington. Hence, popular dissidence from below is seen as dysfunctional. The efficient East Asian governing of the markets is usually explained in terms of state autonomy as against forces in society. Robert Wade even concludes his book by recommending that “effective institutions of political authority (should be developed) before, (and) corporatist institutions as or before, the system is democratized.”13 And the inefficient Indian state governments are usually related to over-politicization and weak political and administrative institutions to handle demands and implement policies, as we have already seen in the writings of Atul Kohli.

Sixthly, the renewed interest in civic virtues, trust and co-operation — now labelled social capital. This, clearly, is an important dimension of the forms of democracy which seem to have a bearing on the content or outcome of democracy. But to state that a democratic culture promotes democracy may be almost tautological. And even the proponents themselves admit that they mainly talk of the performance of an already democratic government, not of democratization. Moreover, the rise of social capital itself remains to be explained more convincingly than with reference to historical continuity or “path dependence.” And at any rate, the current social capital school — just like the old Marxian capital-logic
school — is likely to face problems of explaining politics and policies in an essentially reductionist way, without considering class, movement, organization and so on. For instance, my own ongoing comparative case studies from the Philippines, Kerala, and Indonesia indicate, that while actions and development-work really deepen civil society and really generate social capital — and while this is necessary for further democratization — it is far from sufficient. Actions, movements and organizations do not “automatically” converge and produce the broader issues and perspectives which may generate extended politics of democratization, and thereafter, good democratic policies. The best example is probably Kerala, with the most vibrant civil society and the highest degree of social capital, one can come to think of — and yet, with very different outcome in terms of both democratization and democratic performance over the years. It is true that the degree of social capital varies between being related to special communities and being more genuinely societal. But the main point is that, at least, since the mid-1950s, everything from the generation of societal (and not only group-specific) social capital, and broader forms of further democratization, to efficient democratic performance varies instead primarily with the achievements and problems of genuinely popular and socialist-oriented movement and organization.

Essential Themes for Further Research

So, given the serious limits of the mainstream approaches to democratization in Asia, there are eleven factors and relations that we should explore and give priority to.

First, what are the conditions and possibilities for the deepening and consolidation of middle-class democratization? Even the Philippine showcase, as we know, continues to resemble much of the old cacique democracy.

Second, what will happen where there is even a lack of comparatively independent middle classes, like in Indonesia?

- Actions, movements and organizations do not “automatically” converge and produce the broader issues and perspectives which may generate extended politics of democratization, and thereafter, good democratic policies.
Third, what is the character and importance of organization among new-middle class professionals and their linking up with broader popular movements?

Fourth, what are the conditions for workers under politically engineered, expansive capitalism to play an equally important role in democratization as did workers in Europe and Latin America?

Fifth, how does widespread popular struggle pave the way for and condition elitist negotiation over transition from authoritarian rule and further democratization?

Sixth, why and how is it that popular forces rarely can neither make a direct impact in these negotiations and transitions, nor play a decisive role in thereafter consolidating and deepening democracy? What are the conditions for the integration of popular forces into politics, as opposed to the predominant incorporation of them through either clientelism and populism or co-optation and corporatist measures?

Seventh, what are the conditions for the emergence of a reasonably autonomous civil society under politically engineered capitalism? And how then does the deepening of this civil society affect democratization?

Eighth, what is the impact of globalization and international support of human rights and democratization on the necessary formation of a clearly defined demos in order to build democracy — something which so far has been related to nation-states and relatively autonomous regions and communes within its framework?

Ninth, under what conditions may the so-called good governance emerge? And what is then, the relation between top-down efforts at efficient institutionalization, on the one hand, and popular dissidence, movement and organization from below, on the other?

Tenth, when and how does social capital develop — within various groups and communities, and among them?

Eleventh, and at least to me the most important, what, besides social capital, are the conditions when, and the perceptions and visions with which popular movements and organizations may converge and produce
the broader issues and perspectives which generate extended politics of democratization and efficient policies?

**Approaching the Foundations of Democratization**

These vital but comparatively neglected problems within the scholarly discourse on democracy have, thus, one thing in common — they all call for a closer look at the deeper dimensions or real foundations of democratization.

The most fruitful way of approaching this, I think, is to start with the character of capitalist expansion in general, but focus on the importance of politics, on the one hand, and the partly new and complicated social and economic conflicts, on the other. And this is, thus, to thereafter be able to really concentrate on how it all affects, and is perceived by the popular forces (within nation-states and their relatively autonomous regions or communes) with a potential to take democratization beyond the simple elitist playground.

Could it be, for instance, that the current issues and conflicts carry the seed of a new generation of radical popular demands, movements and organizations with democratization in the forefront? How will this, then, become part of restructured political systems during a process of globalization? And how will it relate to more or less reform-oriented, old movements and organizations which once emerged on the basis of different issues and conflicts, such as anti-imperialism and land reform?

To my knowledge, there is not much research done within this field. Those who have started usually enter from three directions. One is from rather general studies of how popular forces are more or less integrated, or incorporated into mainstream politics. Another is from the predominantly sociological and anthropological studies of the rise and character of social movements (including discursive analysis). Yet another is from queries into more structured organizations based on issues or interests, such as action groups and unions, and eventually, of course, political parties.

These, I think, are the same tracks which we should now continue along — to develop new insights and more fruitful questions and approaches.
For instance, the results that come of my own studies of popular movement and organization in development and democratization, clearly suggest, as already indicated, that while the new popular forces are quite successful in deepening civil society and generating social capital within various groups, and sometimes, even communities as a whole, at the grassroots level, there is little convergence and little generation of broader issues, perspectives and organization which may produce wider politics of democratization in the society at large.

In other words, in this sense, I think there is a special need to focus on the problems of politicizing civil society and the so-called social capital. In which case analytical tools are needed. Allow me to conclude with a brief attempt at specifying some such tools. Politicization means that certain questions, institutions and activities become the object of common societal deliberation. Three aspects are, I believe, most important to consider here: the bases, the forms and the contents. We can trace the bases of politicization to the interests and ideas that lead people to come together. Let us distinguish between common action on the basis of specific questions or self-interest — and such action on the basis of questions linked to ideology or on the basis of individual interests.
connected to common class and societal interests. The forms of politicization are always related to societal organs like a state or local government. The forms vary, however, with whether one "only" demands that certain policies should be carried out by these organs or also really engages in promoting similar ends through self-management, for instance, by way of cooperatives. The contents of democratization have to do with how disparate movements articulate democratic values like liberty and equality in various contexts. Even organizations of an ethnically and religiously chauvinist character, after all, can express and legitimate their methods and goals by reference to the rights and freedoms of their members seen in relation to other groups.

The bases and forms of politicization can be elucidated with a simple matrix; the resulting picture can then be complemented with the contents of politicization (see Table 1).

We can distinguish four basic cases thereby. In square one we find the sort of pluralism in which many different pressure groups, single-issue movements and interest organizations try to influence state and local government politics. In square two, self-managing pluralism is found — in which groups and organizations of a similar sort run their own affairs besides. In square three, we see the kind of broad organizations and corporations (with which we are familiar in Northern Europe especially) which try to affect and to conduct state/municipal politics on the basis of common interests and/or ideas. In square four, finally, we find a situation in which organizations of this latter sort to a great extent run common affairs as well. We can also, of course, locate various kinds of political movements in these four squares, and discuss shifts from one square to another over time.

Notes

1 Hence, I do not only strongly disagree with the relativistic premises of one of the main organizers of this workshop, the Gothenburg Center for East and Southeast Asian Studies — as outlined in their research program, "Democracy in East and Southeast Asia," Gothenburg University, January 1995. I would also argue that they neither establish whether the proponents of so-called "Asian Values Democracy" is democratic and contribute to democratization or not (by comparing like with like), nor situate and analyse this thesis within the discourse as a whole.
2. The authoritarian ideas and practices are rooted in the feudal-like Asian heritage, which was further developed by colonizers, pushed back by the nationalists (who tried instead to combine the ideas of the French revolution and progressive aspects of their own culture), and then resurrected and restructured by new oligarchies and Western promoters of Samuel Huntington’s “politics of order.”


6. Ibid., pp. 27 and 48 ff., respectively.


14. See the separately distributed supplement to this paper: *Popular Movement and Organization in Development and Democratization: Tentative Conclusions from the Philippines, Kerala, Indonesia*.

15. For the full analysis, see my *The Next Left? Democratization and Attempts to Renew the Radical Political Development Project — The Case of Kerala*, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen, 1995, (also forthcoming in *Economic and Political Weekly*).