Linking Local and Global Social Movements and the Anti-ADB Campaigns: From Chiang Mai to Samut Prakarn

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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the factors which facilitated the linking of transnational social movements with local social movements in Thailand with regards to their anti-Asian Development Bank (ADB) campaigns. These transnational social movements include international nongovernment organizations (INGOs), such as the Bank Information Center, International Rivers Network, Greenpeace Southeast Asia, and NGO Forum on the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in assisting the villagers of Klong Dan and social movements in Thailand in pressuring the ADB to look into their allegations concerning the Bank’s Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project (SPWMP). Two of the major issues raised were that the project was environmentally unfriendly and that there was corruption involved in its implementation. A major objective of the INGOs and local social movements was for the ADB to investigate the project based on its established rules and procedures for ascertaining transparency, accountability, and good governance. The paper shows how INGOs played a substantive role in assisting as well as supplementing the efforts of the social movements in this regard. There were, however, also limitations to what the INGOs can do particularly with regard to dealing with the local politics vis-à-vis the SPWMP and the dynamics among the INGOs and between the local, Thai social movements and the INGOs. The efforts of local and international social movements were also supported by local political conditions which contributed to the successful anti-ADB campaigns. External factors also reinforced the advocacy of local and international social movements against the ADB among which were the emergence of the anti-globalizations movements in general and the advocacy of international as well as regional NGOs against ADB projects and policies in general.

KEYWORDS. international nongovernment organizations · social movements · Asian Development Bank · Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project · Thailand

INTRODUCTION

One of the more positive effects of globalization is the nurturing of links between local and global social movements (GSMs) in their fight
for common causes. Such an alliance was seen in May 2000 when local and global social movements joined forces in waging anti-Asian Development Bank (ADB) campaigns during the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB. One of the more contentious issues raised by these social movements was the allegations of the Klong Dan villagers against the ADB’s Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project (SPWMP) in Klong Dan, Samut Prakarn, East Thailand. The villagers believed that corruption was involved in the implementation of the project, and that it was environmentally destructive, resulting in the loss of their livelihood. The anti-SPWMP campaign is considered one of the more successful mobilizations against the ADB as it not only forged a stalemate on what to do with the SPWMP but also led to the prosecution of Thai officials and businessmen.

This paper examines how local and global social movements mobilized around campaigns against the ADB during its 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors and how they pursued such mobilization and campaigns against the SPWMP. It uses the political process theory that focuses on internal and external political opportunity structures, which facilitate as well as hinder contentious politics, taking into consideration the manner in which local and global social movements framed their issues against the ADB as well as their mobilizing capacities. By doing this, the article seeks to shed light on the mobilization potential as well as sociopolitical constraints facing social movements collaborating across borders. Emphasis is placed on the importance of regional and international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) taking interest in local concerns. In particular, it looks at the role played by important summits and meetings, as well as international financial institution (IFI) projects that can be used as targets by collaborating local and global social movements. An important point of unity includes a widely shared consensus about the need for greater transparency and accountability on the part of the ADB. The article will also contextualize this case study in relation to social movement theories and from what other social movements can learn from this case. It also aims to contribute to the growing literature on local and global social movement dynamics around the world.

LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE ANTI-SPWMP LOCAL AND GLOBAL ALLIANCE

The political process theory helps to understand why movements succeed or fail and why they take on differing trajectories. It does this
by taking into consideration differing contexts, i.e., the different political environments that social movements face (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, xi). It examines, in particular, political opportunity structures, or the external political environment that either facilitates or hinders the effort of the people to act collectively and effect change (Tarrow 1994). Moreover, these political opportunities are “not only perceived and taken advantage of by social movements, but they are also created” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 17). As domestic and external political opportunity structures occur simultaneously, what is important to note is that “the international opportunity structure will not displace a domestic political structure but will rather interact with it” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 18-19). These political opportunity structures are also categorized as stable or unstable. The former refers to the political conditions that describe a particular environment. As for the latter, this includes the opening up of access to power, shifts in ruling alignments brought about by cleavages within and among elites, and the availability of influential allies (Tarrow 1994). To further “understand the effects of transnational collective actions” one must also “understand the dynamic interaction between an international opportunity structure and the domestic structure” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 18-19). In relation to this, “movements help to create and recreate meanings through ‘framing’ or the ‘strategic efforts’ by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 12). “Social movements and NGOs often take new ideas and turn them into frames that define issues at stake and the appropriate strategies for action. Carrying this task out transnationally is far more daunting than doing so domestically, but where successful, such activity can have far-reaching effects” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 12). Thus, a third important aspect of the political process theory is mobilization. This “calls attention to resources that are available for social movements to mobilize” (Tarrow 1994). It takes into consideration that “actors and their allies and targets differ in terms of resources they command, their preparedness to make resources available and their ability to use these resource effectively” (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002, x).

The political opportunity structure that laid the foundation for local and global social movement mobilization against the ADB Samut Prakan Wastewater Management Project were the anti-ADB campaigns held in May 2000 at the time of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB in Chiang Mai. Before this, little was known
about the SPWMP, which was approved by the Chuan government in 1995. The USD 605 million project was partly funded by an ADB loan of USD 320 million (Noel 2000 in Tadem 2001), with additional funding of USD 70 million from Japan’s Overseas Environmental Cooperation Fund and THB 750 million from Thailand’s Environment Fund, as well as funding from the National Budget Bureau (Noel 2000).² It was being built on a 1,903-rai³ seaside area in Bang Po district Samut Prakarn on the southern part of Sukhumvit Road. The Pollution Control Department (PCD)⁴ of the Department of Science, Technology and Environment Ministry commissioned the NVPSKG Joint Venture and the Northwest Water International Limited to undertake the construction on a turnkey basis.⁵ Construction of the project was due to be completed within six years (Kanwanich 2000). The project aimed to “improve environmental sanitation and water quality in the densely settled areas of Samut Prakarn and to establish sustainable institutional arrangements for wastewater management and pollution control.”⁶

**Framing the Issue of the Anti-SPWMP Campaigns**

The first to raise the issues against the SPWMP were the Klong Dan villagers of Samut Prakarn. Neither the ADB nor the Thai government had informed them about the SPWMP, and they opposed the project on the following grounds: One was the manner in which the project was being implemented, i.e., the absence of participation and consultation in the community, Klong Dan, where the SPWMP was being built. The second and third issues had to do with their fear that the SPWMP was not environment friendly, i.e., it will raise the salinity of the sea and thus put an end to mussel farming, which is an important source of livelihood for the villagers. The fourth issue was corruption. This was precipitated when the PCD, the agency tasked with implementing the SPWMP, failed to convince the villagers about its reasons for changing the project site from Bang Pla Kod to Bang Poo Mai to their area in Klong Dan. PCD officials informed the villagers that the joint-venture companies that won the bid for the project could not find suitable land in the previous areas. Klong Dan locals, however, believe the real reason is that the land at Klong Dan belongs to a group of companies with close ties to some influential politicians (Tadem 2001).

The concerns raised by the Klong Dan villagers against the SPWMP caught the attention of Thai and global social movements. For the Thai
social movements, the issue of corruption and the absence of participation and consultation were the very reasons that led to several of their uprisings against their government, culminating in the May 1992 middle-class revolt against the military government. If the democratization process served as the stable political opportunity structure, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, on the other hand, became the unstable political opportunity structure, which reinforced such a sentiment. That is, one impact of the financial crisis on the Thai public was they blamed it on the corruption of their officials. Environmental issues, on the other hand, have been very much at the forefront of Thai consciousness as they have seen the environmental destruction caused by rapid economic growth. Thus, one had a situation whereby the Klong Dan villagers “unwittingly” framed their issues in a manner that hit a sensitive chord with the local social movements.

The same could be said of the global social movements that took up the cause of the Klong Dan villagers. The issue of transparency and accountability, for example, attracted GSMs like the Bank for Information Center (BIC), an INGO based in Washington D.C., which looked at such an issue as going against the very core of their advocacy for good governance. Thus, anti-corruption practices concerning the implementation of IFI development projects were very much part of their advocacy. The destruction of the environment and the belief of the Klong Dan villagers that the SPWMP did not undergo an environmental impact assessment required by Thai laws also attracted the BIC to the anti-SPWMP campaigns. As articulated by BIC’s Nurina Widagdo, the SPWMP seemed like a perfect project for her NGO to pursue because it touched on two of its vital concerns, i.e., the absence of an environmental impact assessment and the problem with the ADB’s policy of “Information Disclosure.” Thus, the ADB’s SPWMP would be their test case for the viability of the ADB’s disclosure policy. The same was the concern of Greenpeace Southeast Asia, but unlike the BIC, the Greenpeace, according to Tara Buakamsri, Toxic Campaigns Manager, did not generally engage the ADB as its priority was multilateral agreements, particularly with the World Bank. But Greenpeace Southeast Asia could not ignore the SPWMP because it concerned one of their major advocacies for the industrial sector not to produce toxic waste and to make use of clean technology. For Greenpeace Southeast Asia, the SPWMP, because it was increasing the salinity of the village water, was killing mussel farming and the marine environment. The BIC and Greenpeace can be seen as among
the INGOs that speak for affected communities of IFI projects. In the process, they “claim to offer a unique contribution to the global forum perspectives from people affected by policies and projects but normally excluded from global or national policy-making” (Nelson 2002, 142).

The issues raised by the Klong Dan villagers against the SPWMP in particular and the ADB in general were not new; there already existed a regional movement against the ADB, which generally questioned the bank’s development policies, particularly in the way these affected the environment. As early as 1988 there was a concerted effort among NGOs in the region, among which was the Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), that systematically questioned ADB projects (Quizon and Perez-Corral 1995). Thus there was an existing regional network to wage the anti-ADB campaigns. Such a network found further support with the emergence of the anti-globalization movement, which etched itself in the global public consciousness during the November-December 1999 Battle of Seattle that witnessed thousands of protesters denouncing the World Trade Organization (WTO) during its meeting in Seattle. Such an event, which was followed by other anti-globalization demonstrations against the WTOs and IFIs, did not escape the Thais as they too had their own criticisms in the manner in which multilateral agencies, e.g., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), mishandled their own country’s development, culminating in the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

The Coming Together of Local and Global Social Movements in Chiang Mai

The anti-ADB campaigns during the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB in Chiang Mai (May 6-8, 2000) occasioned the coming together of local and global social movements that shared similar concerns, i.e., their critique of the development policies of IFIs (in this case, the ADB) and their concern for particular issues (e.g., transparency, accountability, corruption, and the environment). Their coming together before and during the meetings of IFIs has been part of anti-globalization campaigns, and the ADB meeting in Chiang Mai was no exception. This has been a general practice of NGOs that have used unofficial parallel conferences, such as the NGO gatherings held at the time of the World Bank and IMF annual meetings to network and publicize their causes (Smith 2000). In general, the ADB annual board of governors’ meetings provide GSMs that have issues against the
ADB—ranging from those who do not agree with its neoliberal ideology policies to those who are concerned with issue of good governance, i.e., transparency and accountability—a venue through which they can raise their concerns as well as link up with the social movements in the locale where the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB was being held. Together with the local social movements, they joined forces to come up with activities by which to highlight their protest against the ADB. Such an activity is part of the strategy of social-movement networks to make use of the “international arena as a stage or mirror to hold state and international organization behavior up to a global judgment about appropriateness they attempt to display or publicize norm-breaking behavior to embarrass public authority” (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002, 12-13). Human-rights activists have called this action the “mobilization of shame” (ibid.). This explains the phenomenon of parallel conferences to IFI meetings. In the case of Thailand, a challenge for GSMs that did not have links with the local social movements was how to create contact with the Thai social movements as well as how best to work with them concerning issues against the ADB. For example, this was the case of Taka Nanri, who was then the head of the NGO Forum on the ADB, and Nurina Widagdo of BIC, as they worked closely together to establish contacts with lead anti-ADB Thai NGOs. There were two prominent NGOs with regard to this: Towards Ecological Recovery for Regional Alliance (TERRA) and the Project for Economic Recovery (PER), both of which are highly critical of the ADB. In particular, they do not adhere to the bank’s neoliberal ideology. Local NGOs provide the link for GSMs who are also critical of the ADB like the BIC. Thus, Nanri, even before the ADB meeting in Chiang Mai, visited Thailand in January and April 2000 to establish contacts with the Thai NGOs. The same was true with Widagdo of BIC.

Defining the Parameters of the Participation of GSMs

As hosts of the anti-ADB campaigns in Thailand, the Thai social movements took the lead in defining how the campaigns were to be undertaken. They informed the GSMs that there were two major venues through which GSMs could link up with the Thai social movements. One was through a parallel conference organized by the NGO-led sector of the ADB known as the People’s Forum 2000 on the ADB. The other was through the anti-ADB demonstrations led by the Networks of 38 People’s Organizations consisting mainly of grassroots
members. The reason for this was that the Thai social movements were divided in their strategies by which to express their anti-ADB sentiments. The People’s Forum—whose lead NGO organizers were the Thai NGOs, composed of the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD) Secretariat, TERRA, and PER, among others—did not want protest actions that could lead to violence, which they felt could alienate the Bangkok middle class whose support they considered important for their cause. Their main objective in holding a People’s Forum on the ADB was to raise public consciousness on the adverse impact of ADB policies. But another faction of the Thai social movements, as represented by the Networks of 38 People’s Organizations led by the Assembly of the Poor, believed that the only way to gain ADB’s attention was through demonstrations. Such a split was not unique to Thai social movements. As Nanri also pointed out, such divisions were also found among the Japanese NGOs that participated in the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai. Although this division provided a point of tension for GSMs who were inclined to participate in both kinds of activities, both factions of the Thai social movements were generally supported by an international alliance engaging the ADB. GSMs participated in both the People’s Forum on the ADB (May 3-5) and the anti-ADB demonstrations during the ADB meetings. There were those in the Thai social movements, like TERRA and PER, who did not believe in engaging the ADB but saw the holding of forums as a means to raise the public’s consciousness concerning adverse ADB policies and projects. They also believed that the need for a peaceful protest was also for the sake of Thailand’s playing a good host to the event (Lertcharoenchok 2000). For the People’s Forum, therefore, the GSMs’ participation was initially limited to their role as speakers in the People’s Forum on the ADB, which aimed “to highlight how the ADB projects and policies are exacerbating poverty, destroying the environment, and undermining the rights, livelihoods, and food security of local communities” (People’s Forum 2000, 383). During the forum, speakers from the GSMs provided case studies in a number of panels on problems about ADB projects, which helped put into context the panel on the SPWMP.

The Thai social movements, however, were united by their refusal to engage the ADB, which made some GSM members uncomfortable as they also saw these parallel conferences as an opportunity to attend official ADB meetings and to “officially” express their concerns. As Nanri said, they felt that the Thai NGOs did not want to deal or engage
with the ADB, but the non-Thai NGOs, particularly the members of the NGO Forum, wanted to. The point of contention among NGOs was whether to debate or engage the IFIs in general or to demonstrate. Although they felt they were in a bind, the non-Thai NGOs generally felt obligated to follow what the Thai social movements, being the hosts, laid down. As one Filipino activist commented, it was quite surprising that the Thais still preferred to demonstrate when doors were already open for activists to engage the ADB officials. The preference not to engage the ADB officials was quite understandable because despite the ensuing democratization process in Thailand, the doors for engagement between NGOs and their very own government have not yet been fully opened. In fact, NGOs continue to be referred to as “communist fronts.” This is different from the experience of other developing countries like the Philippines whereby NGO players have come to occupy key government positions after the downfall of the Marcos dictatorship. One Thai activist noted that if they could not even engage their government, what more an IFI like the ADB.

But as the parallel conference unfolded, one witnessed the flexibility of the Thai social movements as they provided a venue through which the Klong Dan villagers could have a special meeting with three members of the ADB Board of Directors: Acting American Executive Director Cinnamon Dorsife, Acting Austrian Executive Director Uwe Heinrich, and John Lockhart (Tadem 2003). A special meeting was also arranged with Japanese officials from the Ministry of Finance, where local and global social movements expressed their concerns with ADB development policies and the SPWMP project, in particular. And during the ADB official meeting, members of the Thai social movements did not stop GSMs from meeting with ADB officials, whether this had to do with the ADB meeting agenda or not. The same could be said about participation in the anti-ADB demonstrations. No one was stopped from taking part in it. Thus, members of GSMs participated in the three-day anti-ADB demonstrations organized by the Networks of 38 People’s Organizations during the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB on May 6-8, 2000.

The Success of the Anti-ADB Campaigns

The parallel conference and anti-ADB demonstrations were hailed as successful in bringing to public attention the issues and concerns that the social movements had against the bank’s policies and programs. In particular, these raised public awareness on the plight of the Klong
Dan villagers, which was covered for more than a week by the leading Thai and English dailies. Numerous in-depth articles were written about the SPWMP (Tadem 2003). Several factors contributed to its success. One was the democratization process Thailand was undergoing, which could be considered as a domestic political opportunity structure. This opened up windows for popular forms of protests. This was complemented with the emergence of the anti-globalization struggle, an external political structure that allowed for local social movements to identify with the issue raised by GSMs, e.g., being locked out of the decision-making process. Reinforcing this identification was the volatile external political structure of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which highlighted the shortcomings of the neoliberal policies of the IFIs like the World Bank and the IMF, with which the ADB was associated. The financial crisis also brought to light the issue of corruption, which resonated with the Thai public. The identification of Thai social movements with GSMs, therefore, can be explained with what is referred to as the structural affinity model, which considers the importance of shared social organizations or cultures that focus on the mobilization and framing processes of social movements (Giugni 2002, 19). In this case, the Thai social movements could identify with the issues raised by the anti-globalization movement. The Thai and global social movements took advantage of these internal and external political structures to frame the issues for the local and global targets: corruption, the absence of transparency and accountability, and the adverse effects of the IFI’s neoliberal policies.

Much, however, can also be attributed to the ability of the local anti-ADB movement to mobilize resources available for them to come up with their alternative parallel conference and protest actions. These included a growing network of social movements that were both engaging and confronting IFIs. It helped, too, that GSMs provided the international environment with which these campaigns could have a bigger impact. In relation to this, the nature of the anti-ADB campaigns could be best described by the diffusion model, whereby “similarities among social movements in different countries derive from the adoption or protest or certain protest features from abroad” (Giugni 2002, 19). An important resource from which the anti-ADB campaigns in Thailand also benefited was the media environment created by the anti-globalization campaigns since the Battle of Seattle in 1998, which was “followed by a series of demonstrations and associated activities against similar meetings of . . . IFIs, like the ADB, with wide coverage
and interest from the mainstream media” (Widagdo 2001). In terms of the diffusion model, the simulation of global protest actions in Thailand was made possible because of “the communication channel and a flow of information between transmitters and adopters” (Giugni 2002, 19).

In all these, one also takes into consideration how the “movements’ internal dynamics interact with their external contexts” (Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002, 293). This may explain another important factor that contributed to the success of the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai, which was how local and global social movements negotiated their relationship, i.e., within the factions of the local social movements, with those of the global social movements, and between local and global social movements. What was important in all these was the acceptance of such differences, e.g., whether to engage or not to engage and to confront the ADB through demonstrations. Their openness and acceptance of each other’s strategies provided the key to success—those who wanted to engage could do so and those who wanted to confront could. Moreover, the GSMs also gave priority to the preference of the Thai social movements being hosts to the Chiang Mai anti-ADB campaigns. It also helped that the Thai social movements did not stop members of the GSMs from engaging the ADB officials, i.e., participating in official ADB meetings with NGOs. These compromises could be attributed to the successful strategizing of both the local and global social movements, which took into consideration the process of interpreting political opportunities, cultural acceptability of goals, and tactics that could promote change (Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002, 299).

**Defining the Role of GSMs in the Campaign against the ADB’s SPWMP**

The anti-ADB campaigns laid down the foundation for the Thai and global social movements to assist the Klong Dan villagers in their case against the ADB SPWMP. This is one rare instance when a specific IFI project was a direct offshoot of an anti-globalization protest. This could be attributed to the following: for local social movements, the case of the Klong Dan villagers against the SPWMP could easily be understood as it was framed with concerns the Thai public identified with, as reinforced by the 1997 financial crisis, i.e., corruption, transparency, and accountability of both the Thai state and the ADB.
For the GSMs, the SPWMP provided a case study for their fight for better global governance. That is, one “of the primary goals of transnational advocacy is to create, strengthen, implement and monitor international norms. International NGOs and transnational social movements are emerging as a powerful new force in international politics and are transforming global norms and practices” (Khagram, Riker, and Kikkink 2002, 4). Thus, others “see these non-state actors as sources of resistance ‘from below’ to globalization that challenge the authority and practices of states and international institutions that shape the parameter for global governance” (ibid.). The need to make use of the SPWMP as a case study for improving global governance was best expressed by BIC’s Widagdo who was unhappy with the way the meeting between the Klong Dan villagers and the ADB officials transpired in Chiang Mai. She felt nothing came out of it. There was thus a need for the BIC to assist the villagers to pressure the ADB further on the SPWMP.19 The SPWMP could thus be the test case that would provide the means through which the GSMs could pressure IFIs like the ADB to institutionalize mechanisms to check on irregularities in their projects.

Domestic Factors That Led to the Anti-SPWMP Mobilization

Even before the anti-ADB campaigns, ties were already developing among the Klong Dan villagers and the local and global social movements against the SPWMP. The protest actions in Chiang Mai reinforced such linkages in forging the mobilization against the project. The domestic factors that laid down the foundation for this were the following: First was the determination and the unity of the Klong Dan villagers to fight the SPWMP project. Because of this, the Thai state and the ADB could not accuse the struggle against the anti-SPWMP as externally instigated by both local and global social movements. Second, there emerged an effective leader, Dawan Chantarahassadi, who not only led the community but also inspired them. As observed by Saetang of the Campaign for Alternative Industry Network (CAIN), a Thai NGO that took on an active role in supporting the Klong Dan villagers, on her own, Chantarahassadi got involved in stopping the project, and in the process she started to learn about the people’s movements. She learned about similar fights of local communities, such as the one against a coal fire plant in another Thai community. Chantarahassadi was also interested to learn about NGO alternatives, and she would watch television to know more about these issues. This
went hand in hand with building alliances with other movements with a similar cause.20

Mobilizing the local social movements
A third factor could be attributed to the efforts of Chantarahassadi and the Klong Dan villagers to mobilize support from Thai social movements that could identify with their plight. This was seen even before the 2000 anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai: Chantarahassadi already approached CAIN about their problem with the SPWMP. According to Penchom “Ae” Saetang, CAIN gave its support to the villagers as the NGO was also concerned about the industrial pollution associated with the SPWMP and the issue of corruption.21 The same view was expressed by Ravadee Prasertcharoensuk, coordinator of the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD). Prasertcharoensuk stressed that in this struggle against the ADB SPWMP, the Klong Dan villagers are the main players. She pointed out that what gave strength to the villagers struggle was that they were closely knit.22 Among the suggestions of the Thai NGOs, like CAIN, was for the Klong Dan villagers to forge solidarity with other people against the adverse effects of ADB projects and policies, marking the beginning of the involvement of the local social movements to their cause. CAIN, for example, helped the villagers organize meetings and convinced the Klong Dan villagers to write a letter to the ADB Inspection Panel as well as the Thai National Counter-Corruption Committee (NCCC).23 Fourth, the efforts of the villagers and the Thai social movements were also very much helped by the local media in highlighting the case of the SPWMP. As noted by Kanokrat Lerchoosakul, the media did not just rely on NGOs for information but also conducted some fact-finding.24

The NCCC and the support of the Thai senate
Fifth, the Klong Dan villagers were able to make use of the judicial process to file a case against the SPWMP with the NCCC. Taking advantage of the strengthened judicial system, they used the courts to hold government officials for their actions. Their new constitution, particularly articles 46 and 56, stressed the transparency of government and information accessibility.25 This was an offshoot of the democratization process brought about by the 1992 middle-class uprising, providing a volatile domestic political opportunity structure that the local social movements could take advantage of. Sixth, there
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were local efforts to pressure the Thai senate to investigate the SPWMP, which brought forth an unstable political opportunity structure. On May 3, 2001, the Thai senate held a special meeting to discuss the Klong Dan wastewater treatment project and give some recommendations to the government concerning the project’s impact on the environment and the livelihood of local people (Phu Jad Kan, May 23, 2001). The Thai senate, based on a majority vote, also authorized the NCCC to investigate claims of irregularities in the sale of the SPWMP land to the PCD, thus providing another volatile political opportunity structure to the advantage of the anti-SPWMP campaign. These stable and unstable domestic political opportunity structures, ranging from the presence of an active anti-ADB social movement to the existence of state structures for checking transparency and accountability, enabled the Klong Dan villagers and the local and global social movements to mobilize their resources for the anti-SPWMP campaign.

Linking Domestic and External Factors to the Anti-SPWMP Campaign

It was also through the efforts of Chantarahassadi that the Klong Dan villagers forged an alliance with GSMs. This happened when Chantarahassadi approached TERRA to ask how they could get the attention of the ADB to their concerns about the SPWMP. TERRA linked her up with the BIC.26 The GSMs mainly played a supporting role to the actions initiated by the Klong Dan villagers in particular, and the Thai social movements, in general, with regard to the SPWMP. Because of her effectiveness as the spokesperson for the villagers, Chantarahassadi was tapped by the GSMs to participate in their international forums, and this was crucial because the public could see that the locals were the ones speaking out for themselves. BIC’s Wigdado observed that for the GSMs, the presence of a formidable movement at the community level to fight against the SPWMP enabled not only the local but also the global social movements to forge alliances with them and carry a strong campaign against the ADB.27 This allowed the GSMs like the BIC to effectively play a complementary and supportive role in the efforts of the Klong Dan villagers and Thai social movements to pressure the ADB not only to reactivate the bank’s Inspection Function but also to gain the attention of the Thai state and the public with regard to their case against the SPWMP. The ADB, for example, had to be convinced that such a demand was coming from the
local level and was not a “creation” of GSMs. It thus helped the GSMs’ advocacy that the Klong Dan villagers were one in fighting this ADB project.

Because the fight against the SPWMP was framed in terms of two important concerns—the struggle against corruption and environmental degradation—it mobilized a vast network of both local and global social movements, attracting even NGOs with little resources. This was the case, for example, for Greenpeace Southeast Asia, which was very much concerned with the SPWMP’s adverse environmental impact. But as noted by Greenpeace anti-toxic campaigner Buakamsri, there were only a few people in their NGO who could focus on the ADB and even fewer who knew how to lobby and deal with multilateral agencies. But by joining forces with this network of social movements, Greenpeace was able to take advantage of the resources of both the local and global social movements, which also shared their concern to project the issues they had vis-à-vis the ADB’s SPWMP. Buakamsri himself had a lot of interaction with BIC concerning the SPWMP.

This concern is also shared by CAIN. Saetang said she is personally interested in the ADB and the World Bank, and she sees the SPWMP issue as pivotal in bringing about policy changes in the ADB since IFIs are concerned with transparency and anti-corruption issues. She also believes that the Klong Dan experience could influence national-policy loan conditions, which puts debtor-countries at a disadvantage with the impositions of the IFIs. Because of this concern, CAIN joined twenty-nine other NGOs in the anti-SPWMP campaigns. They also linked up with TERRA with respect to international solidarity work on the SPWMP. TERRA did some groundwork in finding out the condition of the Klong Dan villagers and how the SPWMP affected their livelihood. Although TERRA and NGO-COD have requested CAIN for more support, like Greenpeace Southeast Asia, CAIN did not have enough human resources to do so. But CAIN continued to support Chantarahassadi at the local level, with TERRA providing the information and data needed. CAIN’s task was more of helping the local community organize around their anti-ADB campaigns. Saetang said that she would also coordinate with Widagdo of BIC on the anti-corruption aspect of the SPWMP as well as with Terraper of TERRA, Focus on the Global South, and the NGO Forum on the ADB on other issues. Lunthrimar “Tidtee” Longcharoen of TERRA also said that their NGO had a close working relationship with the BIC concerning the SPWMP.
Further fueling the success of the anti-SPWMP campaigns was the unity forged among NGOs that heretofore were split on several issues. TERRA and Greenpeace, for example, generally have differences in perspectives when it comes to IFIs. TERRA and Focus on the Global South are for the abolition of the IFIs like the ADB and the World Bank. This is not the case with Greenpeace, which believes that these institutions could still be reformed. There is also a difference in perspective on what strategies to pursue. TERRA and PER do not believe in engaging IFIs like the ADB, being ardently anti-capitalist and anti-globalization. Thus, these NGOs fit very well in the raison d’être of the anti-globalization campaigns that have less historic engagement with IFIs such as the World Bank and “less interested in the nuances of policy implementation than in vocally protesting the global economic trends” (Nelson 2002, 148). On the other hand, Greenpeace believes that engagement can bring about change in IFIs. Greenpeace can be viewed as part of the second-generation advocacy approach, which is being eclipsed by the anti-globalization movement. This second generation “gives greater attention to pursuing new policies” (Nelson 2002, 148) that will bring reforms to the IFIs. Therefore, as what happened in the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai, the strategizing of GSMs to form an alliance against the SPWMP considered the political opportunity structures that were available and looked into ways in which they could “balance their beliefs about what is possible with their views on what matters, what compromises are acceptable, and who they are (their collective identity).” In this sense, “strategies are a result of both external contexts and internal movement dynamics” (Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002, 299).

There were, however, also exceptions. For example, Thai NGOs decided not to work with a particular INGO—the NGO Forum on the ADB. Nanri said that even after the Chiang Mai protest events, the NGO Forum on the ADB wanted to support the Klong Dan villagers, but the Thai NGOs wanted the villagers to be independent from the NGO Forum. For Nanri, the communication did not turn out well, and there was some kind of misunderstanding. He basically felt that the Thai NGOs did not trust them. For Nanri, the NGO Forum on the ADB also had a misunderstanding with the BIC about the actions to be taken concerning the SPWMP. Nanri felt that the NGO Forum on the ADB did not have the resources to do what the BIC expected of it.
Mobilizing the Resources of the GSMs

Of the GSMs that succeeded in forging links with the Klong Dan villagers and the Thai social movements in general, the GSMs’ support was considered vital, particularly when the Thai state refused to look into the Klong Dan villagers’ complaints against the SPWMP. This was particularly in relation to the major objective of the local and global social movements to subject the SPWMP to an Inspection Function, an ADB mechanism that was never utilized to investigate projects suspected of irregularities. In the case of the SPWMP, it was believed that the ADB Inspection Panel was not allowed into Thailand because Thaksin needed the political families involved in the Klong Dan anomalies to form part of his coalition party. Thus he wanted to stop the SPWMP investigation and had former Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Prapat Panyaracharthat removed since the minister wanted to investigate the project. The GSMs, therefore, provided the venues through which the external environment could be explored, with the ADB as the particular target, for an official investigation of the SPWMP to occur. This could be described as the “boomerang” pattern and the “spiral” model whereby one sees the interaction between the domestic and international opportunity structures (Khagram, Riker, and Kikkink 2002, 19). Both models suggest that blockages in the domestic society send domestic social-movement actors into the transnational arena. This blockage is often due to an authoritarian domestic environment or the absence of any response from the state. Thus, one has a combination of a “closed domestic political opportunity structure and an open international opportunity structure” (Khagram, Riker, and Kikkink 2002, 19). Such a combination is referred to as the boomerang and the spiral.

The Klong Dan villagers mobilized the available resources from the GSMs. First, the GSM pursued the villagers’ demand to have an Independent Review Commission (IRC) to investigate the SPWMP. In relation to this, the GSMs helped the villagers to respond to the ADB’s release of the draft Terms of Reference (TOR) for the IRC, which the bank released by mid-December 2000. Responses to the draft TOR were sent to the bank by several NGOs, including the Center for International Environmental Law, Probe International, the Bank Information Center, and the International Rivers Network (IRN) (Widagdo and Garrido 2002b). This support from the GSMs highlights the difficulty that the ADB imposes on communities that have complaints about the bank’s projects affecting them. In this instance,
the villagers did not have the capability to draft a TOR and had to rely on outsiders to do this. The TOR also had to be written in English, which is a major stumbling block to the villagers who do not speak the language. Second, the GSMs also played an important role in pressuring the ADB when it refused to have a transparent consultation process. International NGOs such as the BIC and the IRN, for example, wrote a letter to the ADB in March 2001 concerning the status and transparency of the establishment of the IRC, particularly in the selection of its members. Furthermore, they demanded that comments on the TOR be made available in Thai to the affected communities (Widagdo and Garrido 2002b). Third, the GSMs also resorted to writing letters to their respective executive directors in the ADB Board of Directors (BOD) to urge their respective countries’ ADB officials to immediately suspend loan disbursements to the SPWMP and “to launch an inspection panel investigation into the violations of ADB policies, the contravention of Thai law, and allegations of corruption in connection with the project” (Ryder 2000).

Fourth, the GSMs participated in protest actions. The GSMs held demonstrations as a reaction to the IRC findings that declared the project design technically sound and that the project will help solve waste problems and reduce pollution in the area. Both the local and global social movements, together with the villagers, exploited an unstable political structure—that is, the opinion of one IRC member, Dr. Pichai Sonchaeng, a marine ecologist and mussel specialist, who admitted that the PCD had underestimated the significance of mussel farming in the Klong Dan region. Dr. Sonchaeng explained that mussel farming could be at risk from diluted salinity caused by the water discharge from the treatment plant (Widagdo and Garrido 2002b, 55).

Fifth, the local and global social movements organized public forums, both locally and internationally, whereby the villagers could publicize their plight. There was, for example, a series of public forums and lobby meetings in Japan on December 1-6, 2000. Chantarahassadi spoke in forums held in Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka to bring their case to the attention of the Japanese public, particularly the Japanese decision makers in the Ministry of Finance, the ADB Japan Representative Office, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and the Diet members. This was very important to do in Japan as the country is the top stakeholder of the ADB, and its financial agencies were responsible for extending the loan that made the project possible (Widagdo and Garrido 2002b, 16). In their attempt to continue the pressure on the
ADB following the bank’s annual conference in Chiang Mai, an international alliance (consisting of groups such as the ADBwatch, Hawaii-based groups, and the Environmental Defense’s Hawaii project office) coordinated with the NGO Forum on the ADB, the BIC, Focus on the Global South, the IRN, and Oxfam America to highlight the plight of the Klong Dan villagers at the 34th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB in Hawaii on July 10, 2001. There was also a People’s Tribunal formed during the parallel conference to the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB in which Chantarahassadi spoke of the irregularities in the SPWMP. In the process, the GSMs hoped to assist the advocacy efforts of the Klong Dan villagers and the NGOs supporting these.

**Increments Gained by Local and Global Social Movements**

Despite efforts at the external level, the fate of the SPWMP lay at the domestic level. The GSMs had to contend with the power of the Thai state. Getting the ADB to agree to an inspection of the SPWMP was only half the battle; the other half was getting the acquiescence of the Thai government, which disallowed the ADB Inspection Panel to carry out their investigation on the SPWMP. This prompted INGOs to pressure the ADB president to intervene, which he did. But such efforts were to no avail. The reaction of the Thai state could be attributed to a general attitude of borrowing governments, which “resent the expanded involvement of transnational networks” (Nelson 2002, 150) in IFI policies. Much of the work that had to be made in this aspect thus relied generally on the Klong Dan villagers and the local social movements. As Widagdo of BIC observed, they could not win because of the flaws in the Inspection Function, but with direct pressure on the ADB, they would be able to get media attention to assist the Klong Dan villagers.³⁸

However, the efforts of GSMs and their Thai counterparts seemed to be vindicated when the Final Report of the Inspection Panel on the Samut Prakan Wastewater Management Project found that the ADB had not fully complied with its policies and procedures in processing and implementing the project. The “victory,” however, would be short-lived. On March 25, 2002, the ADB Board of Directors (BOD) opted for a compromise whereby the board refrained from fully endorsing the BIC report. Instead, it came out with a carefully worded statement committing the ADB to being “an active participant” with the Klong Dan community and the Thai government in the “proper
assessment of damages by the Thai government, and where relevant, the award of appropriate compensation” (Bello 2002, 66). The board’s failure to mention any wrongdoing on the part of management, much less reprimand it, was, in the view of some observers, one more step in a retreat from confrontation with management (ibid., 6).

A divided ADB Board of Directors
This, however, came at a heavy price: a sharply divided board between the directors from the bank’s developing member countries (DMCs), which generally rejected the findings and recommendations, and most directors representing the donor countries who accepted them (Guttal 2001). This controversy led to the resignation of two members of the Board Inspection Committee (BIC): BIC Chairman John Lockhart, who is also the Australian executive director; and Frank Black, representing a bloc of countries including the United Kingdom. Black stated that he could “no longer associate himself with the Bank’s current inspection process” (Widagdo and Garrido 2002a, 66). Such a situation could seem like an unstable political structure, which anti-ADB movements could exploit. This was because what happened was quite unusual in the ADB vis-à-vis its general policy of consensus building. As Quizon noted, one never gets to know the voting process in the ADB.39 A perceived backlash of the “scandal” produced by the SPWMP incident on the ADB operations was the shutdown of the ADB Thailand Office, which opened only a couple of years before the anti-ADB campaigns, headed by Craig Steffensenson. As observed by Greenpeace advocate Tara Buakamsri, the ADB definitely scaled down its projects in Thailand. He said that after the SPWMP, he has not heard of any progress in ADB development projects in Thailand, except for some in the private sector.40

Despite this cynicism on the role of GSMs in the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai, the ADB admitted the need to strengthen its relationship with NGOs. It undertook a new strategy of involving other ADB offices in dealing with NGOs in addition to the bank’s NGO Coordinating Office. Furthermore, it gave more organizational resources—labor and financial—to the ADB-NGO Coordinating Office.41 Almost a year later, the NGO Coordinating Office was replaced by the NGO Coordination Network, headed by Robert Dobias. It also launched the Partnership Newsletter, which aimed “to improve communication with civil society and to strengthen the ADB’s partnership with NGOs in the common fight against poverty in
the region.” An ADB Center was also established in the bank in February 2001, with Civil Society Analysts (ADB 2001b). All of these changes are in recognition of the local and global social movements’ efforts to improve ADB transparency and accountability by institutionalizing its engagement of social movements. As noted by an ADB staff, the SPWMP caused a lot of internal changes.\(^42\) Besides the dismissal of Gordon Wilkinson and the abolition of the office he headed (the ADB-NGO Coordinating Office), the SPWMP controversy ushered in a whole system of accountability. His office, for example, is now made to report directly to the ADB Board of Directors. Finally, the Inspection Function, which has proven useless, was changed to a Compliance Review Panel. A special project facilitator position has also been created, tasked to show that there has been compliance in the ADB project since the beginning. This will prevent ADB loans from being disbursed without compliance, unlike in the case of the SPWMP.\(^43\) Such changes are quite substantive, considering the nature of the ADB.

For Quizon, when his NGO ANGOC was formed, there was still no policy disclosure on the part of the ADB. Furthermore, there was no accountability measure.\(^44\)

At the local level, the findings of the BIC were also reiterated on August 2, when the NCCC released the findings of its report entitled “Businessmen, Government and Corruption” (Phongpaichit et al. 2002). The report, which looked into three cases of possible corruption, including that of the SPWMP, revealed, among other things, that in the SPWMP, no environmental impact assessment was made despite the project’s huge impact on the local environment, as well as on the livelihood and welfare of the villagers living nearby. Furthermore, the Klong Dan villagers had no idea about the project before it was approved. The report also pointed out that the “villagers around Klong Dan eventually objected to the project on the ground of its negative environmental impact. They sent petitions to the ADB . . . but got no satisfactory response.” The report also accused the ADB of being “so anxious to lend the money to the Thai government that it ignored or deliberately overrode its own policies with respect to environmental standards and relocation of people. It did not require that an environmental impact assessment and social impact assessment were carried out before the project went ahead” (ibid, 69). The NCCC findings set forth a series of investigations and corruption cases against officials and businessmen involved in the SPWMP (Samabuddhi 2005). The Thai senate also formed a special committee to investigate
dereliction of duty on the party of several government agencies, which have been too lenient in taking action on the controversial SPWMP (Susanpoolthong 2005).

Despite these victories, there are still formidable challenges ahead for GSMs and Thai social movements vis-à-vis the SPWMP, in particular, and in “democratizing” the ADB, in general. At the local level, Natural Resources and Environment Minister Yongyuth Tiyapairat announced that the SPWMP project will go ahead, adding that “finishing the project, which could cost up to 700 million baht, would not be a burden on taxpayers” (Samabuddhi 2005). According to Buakamsri, the PCD is also exerting efforts to get the Klong Dan villagers to participate in a committee that will determine alternatives for the SPWMP. These include the following: (1) continue the project for as long as it does not adversely impact on the people; (2) reuse the wastewater to serve another purpose, e.g., irrigation and agriculture, for treated wastewater; and (3) change the project to a marine resource center. Buakamsri said that the Klong Dan villagers did not join the committee because to support it would mean legitimizing the project.45 Other options floated: (1) to complete construction and recycle wastewater; (2) to complete construction and mitigate pollution and toxic environment; and (3) to go back to the earlier location, Bang Poo Mai.46 According to Saetang, because of strong opposition from the Klong Dan villagers, no consultant company or academic institution would be willing to accept the job of doing feasibility studies on the SPWMP.47

At the ADB level, the ADB staff mentioned previously, cautioned that despite efforts to improve coordination between the ADB and civil society, the ADB still treats such an endeavor as a failure of public relations. The NGO Center is headed, for example, by Dobias, whom the ADB informant views as more of a PR person. For the ADB staff this is wrong, as the main issue is that the ADB NGO unit is not a “mailbox” to which the NGOs can just send their complaints, comments, or suggestions for the ADB to take note of, but a real venue for engaging the NGOs. The ADB’s general attitude toward NGOs, therefore, has apparently not changed since the 2000 anti-ADB campaigns. The view of the ADB officials was that there was nothing wrong with their policies; they were merely misunderstood. Hence the need to communicate better with communities where there are ADB projects. Such an attitude, said the ADB staff, can also be attributed to the ADB’s management mind-set, which is conservative and not very open to change. That is, they are bureaucrats with comfortable salaries
and are not about to rock the boat. As Quizon notes, the ADB has created a huge bureaucracy where some people have stayed for more than twenty years. One cannot expect them to change. For the ADB staff and Quizon the pressure for change generally emanates from the ADB Board of Directors (BoD) particularly from the developed countries as seen in the debate on the SPWMP. But there are also BoD members, generally from the developing countries, who are not receptive, particularly those from “authoritarian regimes.” The pressure, therefore, for change will not come from within but externally, as in the case of the anti-ADB campaigns in Chiang Mai and the campaigns against the SPWMP.  

CONCLUSION

The article has shown that much of the success of local social movements and GSMs in engaging the ADB with regard to the controversy surrounding the SPWMP owes much to their linkage and complementation in activities in support of the Klong Dan villagers. This could be attributed to domestic and international political opportunity structures, both stable and volatile, which they either took advantage of or created to pursue their struggle. The stable domestic political opportunity structures included the democratization process in Thailand, which opened doors for protest actions and legal venues to question the ADB SPWMP and the presence of an active media to sustain public awareness in Thailand of the issue against the ADB SPWMP. The democratization process also paved the way for domestic volatile political opportunity structures, e.g., allies from members of the Thai senate and the NCCC that questioned the SPWMP. This situation was also aided by a united, strong local community, the Klong Dan villagers, that pushed the fight against the SPWMP. The emergence of a formidable leader, Chantarahassadi, has helped them immensely. For the local and global social movements that were waging the anti-ADB campaigns, one could consider this a volatile domestic political structure even though these were not elites but the lower classes. Another volatile political structure was the creation of an occasion to project their advocacies, and the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of ADB in Chiang Mai in 2000 provided for this. The holding of anti-ADB campaigns during this event through a parallel conference and demonstrations raised awareness of common issues that people in various countries had against the ADB.
As for the external opportunity structures, there existed an anti-globalization movement, which enabled the Thai social movements to link up with GSMs. This was very much helped by the Battle of Seattle of 1999. The 1997 Asian financial crisis, as a volatile political opportunity structure, also contributed to such a movement in Asia in general and in Thailand in particular. Another external opportunity structure was the existence of an anti-ADB regional and international alliance of NGOs (e.g., ANGOC) and INGOs (e.g., BIC), which through the years have strongly advocated for the monitoring of the implementation of ADB projects.

The way the local and global social movements framed their issues made also for the success of the campaign against the SPWMP. There was, for example, a consensus on the way the ADB should implement its projects—that is, there is a need for the participation of the stakeholders in the conceptualization and implementation of projects in their areas. These GSMs also agreed that such projects should not destroy both the environment and the livelihood of the communities concerned. The way the resources were mobilized in the anti-ADB campaigns and in the anti-SPWMP struggle also contributed to incremental gains for both the local and global social movements. The way GSM participation was defined by the local social movements as well as the flexibility of the latter to also accommodate the needs of the GSMs resulted in a series of actions that were all united in one cause, i.e., to raise public consciousness about the adverse effects of ADB policies and programs and to stop the SPWMP. The GSMs’ resources were also mobilized to assist the Klong Dan villagers in particular and the Thai social movements in general. These included assistance in the drafting of the Terms of Reference for the ADB inspection panels on the SPWMP, pressuring the Board of Directors who come from the countries of the members of the GSMs to inspect the SPWMP, support local protest actions, and organize local and international forums.

But much remains to be done. First, the reality is that the state could prevent any inspection of the ADB of their projects in their respective countries. Thus, much is left for the local social movements and the affected communities to pressure their state, which in the case of the SPWMP was to no avail. Second, the general mind-set in the ADB toward civil society and social movements is not one of engagement but one of “PR” work. Nevertheless, the Klong Dan villagers, together with the local and GSMs, shook the Thai state with charges of corruption against politicians and bureaucrats involved in the SPWMP.
The ADB did, however, make some changes, which resulted not only in the creation of new office(s) to deal with civil society but also in the establishment of a new mechanism by which to ascertain compliance in the ADB projects. That the SPWMP has yet to be operational is evidence that the Thai state and the ADB have succumbed to popular pressure.

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NOTES

1. Headquartered in the Philippines, the ADB is the multilateral bank charged with promoting economic growth in developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Although its primary founding members and two largest stockholders are Japan and the United States, it now consists of sixty members (Widagdo 2001).
2. The Japan’s Overseas Environmental Cooperation Fund became the Japan Bank for International Cooperation when it merged with the Japan Exim Bank.
3. One rai is equivalent to 1,600 square meters.
4. The implementation of the SPWMP is under the supervision of the PCD as the executing agency, including implementation of the pollution prevention and capacity-building programs (ADB 2001a).
5. The term “turnkey basis” refers to the fact that “the contractor had to find the land, provide the construction technology, construct and pre-operate the project for three years before handing it over to the authority” (Kanwanich 2000).
6. For a more detailed account of the background and problems regarding the ADB’s SPWMP, please see Widagdo and Garrido (2002).
7. Nurina Widagdo (Bank for Information Center, Phnom Penh, Cambodia), interview with the author, April 5, 2004, handwritten notes.
8. Tara Buakamsri (toxic campaigns manager, Greenpeace Southeast Asia, Bangkok, Thailand), interview with the author, April 26, 2004, handwritten notes.
9. Srisuwan Kuankachorn (director of the Project for Economic Recovery, Bangkok, Thailand), interview with the author, September 25, 2000, handwritten notes. According to Kuankachorn, their NGO and other Thai NGOs and Japan-based NGOs have been monitoring the ADB projects ever since the 1997 Asian financial crisis when the ADB became a prominent player in “rescuing” the Thai economy.
10. For further details, see Tadem (2003).
11. The other Thai NGOs that were also part of these were Aids Network, Foundation of Women, Northern Farmers Federation, Assembly of the Poor, North Net, and the Thai Development Support Committee.
12. Takahiro Nanri (former coordinator of the NGO Forum on the ADB), interview, June 15, 2004, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, handwritten notes.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. Heinrich is in charge of ADB constituencies in the United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, Austria, and Australia while Lockhart is in charge of ADB constituencies in China, Cambodia, Australia, Hong Kong, and five Pacific Islands.
17. For further details on the anti-ADB campaigns in Thailand, see Tadem (2003).
18. For further details, see Tadem (2004).
19. See note 7 above.
20. Kanokrat Lerchoosakul (lecturer, Department of Government, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok), interview, April 27, 2004, handwritten notes.
22. Ravadee Prasertcharoensuk (coordinator, NGO-COD), interview, April 17, 2004, handwritten notes.
23. See note 21 above. This Inspection Function to be utilized by a designated Inspection Panel can also be found in other IFIs such as the World Bank (Nelson 2002).
24. See note 20 above.
25. See note 20 above.
27. Nurina Widagdo, interview (phone call to Phnom Penh, Cambodia), April 15, 2004, handwritten notes.
28. See note 8 above.
29. See note 21 above.
31. Ibid.
33. The first generation of international advocacy was more concerned with “confrontation over specific projects and collaboration in project implementation and dialogue over issues such as participation” (Nelson 2002, 148).
34. See note 32 above.
35. See note 12 above.
36. Nualnoi Treerat (associate professor, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand), interview, April 16, 2004, handwritten notes.
37. Also referred to as the Independent Review Team (IRT).
38. See note 7 above.
40. See note 8 above.
41. Gordon Wilkinson (ADB senior social development specialist NGO coordinator, Office of Environment and Social Development, ADB Headquarters, Manila), interview, July 18, 2000, handwritten notes.
42. Interview with an ADB staff, January 21, 2005, handwritten notes. The interview was conducted in confidentiality and the name of the interviewee has been withheld by mutual agreement.
43. Ibid.
44. See note 39 above.
45. See note 9 above.
46. See note 21 above.
47. See note 21 above.
48. See notes 39 and 42.

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